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Comments
SHUT UP AND PITCH: MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S POWER
STRUGGLE WITH MINOR LEAGUE PLAYERS IN
SENNE V. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP.
“After twelve years in the major leagues, I do not feel I am a piece of property
to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. . . . [A]ny system which
produces that result violates my basic rights as a citizen and is inconsistent
with the laws of the United States and of the several States.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: PLAY BALL!
For over a century, baseball has reigned as America’s pastime.2
In 2019 alone, Major League Baseball (MLB) generated gross reve-
nues of nearly eleven billion dollars.3  While the MLB and its play-
ers reap the benefits of its profitability, a group remains ignored:
minor league players.4  Similar to other professional sports, the
1. Letter from Curt Flood to Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball (Dec.
24, 1969) (on file with the National Archives, Identifier: 278313) (criticizing
MLB’s control over players).
2. See John Rowady, America’s Pastime, MEDIAPOST (July 3, 2012), https://
www.mediapost.com/publications/article/178091/americas-pastime.html [https:/
/perma.cc/4Z3W-PD76] (reporting baseball was first dubbed “the national pas-
time” in 1856).  “Whoever wants to know the heart and mind of America had bet-
ter learn baseball . . . .”  Ira Berkow, What is Baseball’s Meaning and Its Effect on
America, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/31/
sports/what-is-baseball-s-meaning-and-its-effect-on-america.html [https://
perma.cc/3FTY-QZRS] (quoting JACQUES BARZUN, GOD’S COUNTRY AND MINE: A
DECLARATION OF LOVE SPICED WITH A FEW HARSH WORDS (Bos.: Little, Brown & Co.
1954)) (describing MLB’s fundamental role in American society).
3. See Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES
(Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-
sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for-2019/#38e7ad2b5d78 [https://perma.cc/
GAW2-N8ZE] (reporting 2019 marked MLB’s seventeenth consecutive year of re-
cord revenue growth).  Despite declining attendance and mediocre World Series
ratings, “a perceived decline in the popularity of baseball in the United States”
could not be further from reality.  Juliette Love, How Popular Is Baseball, Really?,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/22/
sports/baseball/baseball-popularity-world-series.html [https://perma.cc/26JA-
ZXKG] (explaining baseball’s domination over other professional sports in
America).  “MLB teams play at least 2,430 regular-season games each season, com-
pared with only 256 regular-season games for the NFL and 1,230 for the NBA.
Even the 160 MLB-affiliated minor league teams sold nearly 50 million tickets in
2017.” Id. (comparing annual ticket sales of American professional sports
leagues).
4. See Garrett R. Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects of Collec-
tive Bargaining on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51, 52
(53)
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MLB relies on a “farm system,” known as Minor League Baseball
(MiLB), for player development.5  Despite its dependence on the
MiLB, the MLB treats minor league players as second class athletes,
forcing many to accept below the minimum wages and sub-par
working conditions, while still expecting players to work long hours
to hone their talents in hopes of a shot in the majors.6
In Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.,7 current and for-
mer minor league players are attempting to combat poor working
conditions and low payment practices with a novel legal attack.8
Plaintiffs in Senne assert the MLB, its Commissioner, and several af-
filiated MLB teams are in violation of federal law, under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and various state wage-and-hour laws
by paying minor leaguers below minimum wage and failing to pro-
vide overtime wages.9  The outcome of this case impacts the MLB,
MLB affiliated teams, the MiLB, MiLB affiliated teams, current and
future baseball players both amateur and professional, as well as the
communities where these teams are located.10
In early 2020, tensions between the MLB and MiLB players in-
tensified due to a global pandemic.11  For the first time in twenty-
five years, baseball, as well as the rest of the United States, shut
down.12  State-imposed shutdowns and shelter-in-place mandates
led to a cancellation of spring training and a two week postpone-
ment of the start of the regular season.13  By mid-summer, MLB
(2013) (explaining how exploitation will continue until minor leaguers “gain true
and real representation” at bargaining table).
5. See Doug Bernier, What is Minor League Baseball?, PRO BASEBALL INSIDER,
http://probaseballinsider.com/what-is-minor-league-baseball/ [https://
perma.cc/ZF7T-565M] (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (outlining basics of MiLB).
6. See Sam C. Ehrlich, Minor Leagues, Major Effects: What If Senne Wins?, 6 MISS.
SPORTS L. REV. 23, 24 (2016) (discussing potential results if Plaintiffs succeed in
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.).
7. 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019).
8. See Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 24 (detailing Plaintiffs’ claims). R
9. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 924–25 (discussing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Con-
solidated Class Action Complaint filed in Northern District of California).
10. See Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 26 (noting “major ramifications” on profes- R
sional sports industry).
11. See James Jacaruso, Baseball Takes a Hit, but Hits Back!, https://
www.eisneramper.com/baseball-covid-19-0420/ [https://perma.cc/75A6-LJ6K]
(Apr. 27, 2020) (discussing prior instances of MLB work stoppage).
12. See id. (comparing MLB players’ strike in 1995 to COVID-19 shutdown);
see also Broshuis, supra note 4, at 78-81 (discussing MLB strike of 1994-95). R
13. See Dayn Perry, Katherine Acquavella & R.J. Anderson, Timeline of How the
COVID-19 Pandemic has Impacted the 2020 Major League Baseball Season, CBS SPORTS
(July 29, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/timeline-of-how-the-covid-
19-pandemic-has-impacted-the-2020-major-league-baseball-season/ [https://
perma.cc/87Q7-RE6Q] (reporting timeline of COVID-19’s impact on 2020 MLB
2
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teams eventually took the field to play in empty stadiums, while the
MiLB 2020 season was completely cancelled.14  The COVID-19 pan-
demic undoubtedly threw professional baseball a major curveball,
shining an even brighter light on the severe disadvantages minor
league players are subject to compared to their MLB
counterparts.15
This Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s Senne decision and as-
serts the court’s decision serves as a momentous victory for minor
league players in their fight for fair wages.16  Section II establishes
the relevant facts and procedural history of Senne.17  Section III pro-
vides a background of the law relevant to the decision as well as the
relationship between the MLB and the MiLB.18  Next, Section IV
summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning behind their decision.19
Section V discusses the inconsistency of the Ninth Circuit’s holding
with other circuit court precedent and critically analyzes why this
season).  Professional baseball was not alone in suffering from the pandemic, as
college baseball also experienced major implications from COVID-19, including
the cancellation of conference championships. See Zach Spedden, COVID-19 Pan-
demic Continues to Affect NCAA Baseball, BALLPARK DIGEST (Mar. 18, 2020), https://
ballparkdigest.com/2020/03/18/covid-19-pandemic-continues-to-affect-ncaa-base-
ball/ [https://perma.cc/Q85L-PZW6] (listing several college conferences decid-
ing to cancel baseball championships as result of COVID-19).
14. See Christian Collins & Casey Simmons, Major League Baseball Is Back. For
Minor Leaguers Still at Home, It’s a Reminder of the Pandemic’s Disproportionate Economic
Consequences, URBAN INSITUTE (July 24, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/
major-league-baseball-back-minor-leaguers-still-home-its-reminder-pandemics-dis-
proportionate-economic-consequences [https://perma.cc/54C9-RAJM] (“[T]he
games not played in minor league ballparks should serve as a representation of
low-wage workers’ disadvantages. . . . ”).
15. See id. (arguing minor league disadvantages “have been exacerbated in
the economic fallout from the pandemic”).  Legislative action to cure low wages
and unemployment, while not a novel solution, is one remedy further demonstrat-
ing the inadequacies of treatment for minor leaguers. See id. (noting most MiLB
players received $400 per week from MLB during the pandemic, while filing for
federal unemployment insurance pays about $600 per week).  “That minor leagu-
ers can currently make more through social safety net benefits shows how neces-
sary these benefits have been.” Id. (suggesting policymakers as possible way for
minor league players to achieve fair wages).
16. For further discussion of the court’s opinion in Senne, see infra notes
144–184 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of Senne’s impact, see infra R
notes 202–226 and accompanying text. R
17. For further discussion of Senne’s factual background, see infra notes 22-44 R
and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the initial class action suit and
subsequent District Court decision, see infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. R
For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s appellate decision, see infra notes 60- R
65 and accompanying text. R
18. For further discussion of class and collective actions, as well as relevant
labor issues within baseball, see infra notes 70-143 and accompanying text. R
19. For further discussion of the court’s decision in Senne, see infra notes 144- R
184 and accompanying text. R
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divergence in precedent is positive for minor league players.20
Lastly, Section VI predicts the impact of the Ninth Circuit ruling in
Senne and comments on the durability of baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion in anticipation of the 2021 expiration of the Professional Base-
ball Agreement (PBA) and ongoing negotiations between the MLB
and MiLB.21
II. FACTS: A STACKED DUGOUT
Coined as a rite of passage, an overwhelming majority of base-
ball players must endure the grind of being a minor league player
before ever stepping up to the plate in a major league game.22  Mi-
nor league players are forced to accept sub-par treatment to achieve
their goals of making it to the big leagues.23  When a player is
drafted or signed by an MLB team, the player is not automatically
listed on the forty-man roster of the MLB team.24  Rather, most ath-
letes must vie through the ranks of the minor league system before
playing for that MLB team.25
20. For critical analysis of the court’s decision in Senne, see infra notes 185-201 R
and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of the impact of Senne, see infra notes 202-212 and R
accompanying text.  For further discussion of how the United States Congress and
local governments have stepped up to bat in support of the minor leagues, see
infra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the real-life R
consequences for the small towns scattered across American impacted by the
MiLB, see infra notes 218-226 and accompanying text. R
22. See Scott Orgera, ’More Than Baseball’ Aims To Help Minor Leaguers With
Food, Housing, Equipment And Other Services, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/scottorgera/2019/02/20/more-than-baseball-aims-to-help-
minor-leaguers-with-food-housing-equipment-and-more/#24f4d84c1279 [https://
perma.cc/T5UT-JQ37] (“Right or wrong, subpar living conditions for minor
league players have long been looked upon as an accepted part of life in profes-
sional baseball.”).
23. See id. (describing how minor league life is romanticized in films).
24. See id. (explaining process of playing pro baseball).
25. See id. (detailing most MLB players start out in minor leagues).  The pro-
fessional path to the MLB is much slower compared to other professional sports.
See Jason Catania, Players to Go Straight from MLB Draft to the Show, MLB (Sept. 18,
2020), https://www.mlb.com/news/players-who-went-directly-from-the-draft-to-
mlb [https://perma.cc/3NRY-SL3S] (detailing history of MLB’s draft).  While in-
ternational players are not subject to the MLB draft, a majority of American base-
ball players are, and “[s]ince the MLB Draft began in June 1965, only [twenty-two]
players have gone from being selected via that process straight to MLB without first
playing in the Minors.” Id. (considering rarity of playing in MLB straight from
draft).
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A. Underlying Claim: Minor Leaguers Look to Fight in Big
League Court
Plagued with low wages and long working hours, life for a mi-
nor leaguer is anything but glamourous.26  The MLB has long got-
ten away with paying minor leaguers below minimum wage under
the guise that minor league talent is dispensable.27  Many minor
league players must live with multiple teammates in cramped apart-
ments, well exceeding capacity.28  Players justify these realities as
means to an end.29
The MLB has largely circumvented any challenges to halt this
mistreatment due to baseball’s infamous antitrust exemption.30
Historically, all professional baseball players were subjected to the
MLB’s collusion power; however, major league players overcame
this stronghold with the formation of the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA) and negotiating collective bargaining
agreements (CBA).31  Unfortunately, minor league players were ex-
cluded from the MLBPA, despite making up the overall majority of
baseball players employed by the MLB.32  Without any organized
26. See Dirk Hayhurst, An Inside Look into the Harsh Conditions of Minor League
Baseball, BLEACHER REPORT (May 14, 2014), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2062307-an-inside-look-into-the-harsh-conditions-of-minor-league-baseball [https:/
/perma.cc/MV3S-PLAM] (referring to unspoken rule playing in MiLB is a “brutal
experience” involving low wages, decrepit facilities, and inhumane working
hours).
27. See id. (referring to large pool of hungry amateur talent willing to endure
poor conditions for chance to play pro ball).
28. See Tom Goldman, Fight Against Low, Low Pay in Minor League Baseball Con-
tinues Despite New Obstacles, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
2018/08/03/635373608/fight-against-low-low-pay-in-minor-league-baseball-contin-
ues-despite-new-obstacl [https://perma.cc/SK5P-K9TJ] (bartering personal pos-
sessions, bats, gloves, and clothing).
29. See Hayhurst, supra note 26 (noting MiLB players often take on side jobs R
such as speaking engagements or signing events to make ends meet).  Minor
league life boils down to a game of who can last the longest living a life of paucity.
See id. (implying many players do not last in the minor league system).
30. See Lucas J. Carney, Major League Baseball’s Foul Ball: Why Minor League Base-
ball Players Are Not Exempt Employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 41 J. CORP. L.
283, 289 (2015) (referring to numerous failed attempts of players to challenge
MLB); see also Broshuis, supra note 4, at 90–92 (summarizing effects of not having R
union for minor leaguers).
31. See Second Consolidated Am. Compl. for Violations of Federal and State
Wage and Hour Laws, at 4, Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 3:14-cv-
00608-JCS, 2015 WL 4197303 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2015) [hereinafter “Second Con-
solidated Amended Complaint”] (arguing minor league players unfairly remain
victim to MLB’s collusion).
32. See id. (suggesting need for alternative way to protect minor league play-
ers).  Each year, the MLB pays over half a billion dollars to approximately 7,500
minor league players; however, according to the MLB, “being a Minor League
Baseball player is not a career but a short-term seasonal apprenticeship in which
5
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MiLB bargaining unit, minor leaguers lack any power to “combat
the collusive power of the MLB cartel.”33  Furthermore, in 2018, the
MLB dedicated significant resources to lobbying Congress to rein-
force the MLB’s chokehold on minor leaguers, thus telling these
athletes, in essence, to shut up and pitch.34
Given their lack of bargaining power, Plaintiffs in Senne opted
for an alternate method to challenge the MLB’s Front Office, filing
a law suit in federal court, asserting that the MLB’s low wages for
MiLB players violated federal and state wage-and-hour laws.35  For
example, named Plaintiff and former first baseman, Aaron Senne,
played pro ball from 2010 to 2013.36  During his time in the minors,
Senne claimed he was paid “about $3,000 for the entire 2010 sea-
son, $3,000 in 2011, about $7,000 in 2012, and $3,000 in 2013.”37
Plaintiffs claim these wages are well below the Federal Poverty Level
(“FPL”).38  Although Plaintiffs conceded to baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption, they argue this antitrust loophole, “in no way provides an
exemption from the federal and state wage and hour laws that the
Defendants routinely violated.”39
the player either advances to the Major Leagues or pursues another career.”  Press
Release, MLB, Major League Baseball Statement (June 30, 2016), https://
www.mlb.com/press-release/major-league-baseball-statement-187167466 [https://
perma.cc/9DZL-VWNB] (supporting passage of congressional legislation exempt-
ing minor league players from federal minimum wage and overtime hours
requirements).
33. See Second Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 5 (argu- R
ing MLB unlawfully violating anticompetitive laws).
34. See Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Legislation
Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1023–26 (2019) (presenting MLB’s con-
certed effort to maintain power).
35. See Blake Yagman, Senne v. Royals is the case that could change Major League
Baseball, FANSIDED (Oct. 25, 2017), https://fansided.com/2017/10/25/senne-v-
royals-lawsuit-could-change-mlb/ [https://perma.cc/D3HE-EHPX] (arguing MLB
paid wages below poverty levels); see also Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp.,
105 F. Supp. 3d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (representing Senne’s original case).
36. See Yagman, supra note 35 (noting Senne played four years at Missouri R
before being “drafted twice by the Minnesota Twins and once by the (then) Flor-
ida Marlins”).  In 2013, Senne retired from baseball, and the following year filed
this class action lawsuit against the MLB. See id. (reporting Senne never played in
the majors during his professional baseball career).
37. Yagman, supra note 35 (detailing wages of Senne during career as MLB R
player); see also Second Consolidated Am. Compl., supra note 31, at 44 (detailing R
Senne’s allocation of wages).
38. See Yagman, supra note 35 (reporting $13,860 is current Federal Poverty R
Level).  During his time playing for the MiLB, Senne “was forced to take on addi-
tional jobs to supplement his revenue.” Id. (noting supplemental income covered
costs for proper baseball training).
39. Second Consolidated Am. Compl., supra note 31, at 4 (“MLB’s longstand- R
ing exemption from the United States’ antitrust laws allows it to openly collude on
the working conditions for the development of its chief commodity: young base-
ball players.”).
6
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In defense, the MLB argued Plaintiffs’ claims could not survive
as a class action or collective action because of the variations in
state laws and variations in individual players’ schedules.40  In 2018,
while preliminary class certification issues were still being litigated,
Congress passed the Save America’s Pastime Act (SAPA), which ex-
empted MiLB players from protections under FLSA.41  SAPA had a
crucial impact on Senne, as it made Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims moot,
leaving their state claims as their only viable option.42  In reaction
to Plaintiffs’ claims, the MLB argued that minor leaguers are ex-
empt from minimum wage requirements since they are classified as
seasonal apprentices.43  Furthermore, the MLB threatened that if
they were to increase minor league wages, a reduction in the num-
ber of minor league teams would result.44
40. See Zachary Zagger, 9th Circ. Ruling Puts Minor League Pay Back on The Ta-
ble, LAW360 (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1190135/9th-circ-
ruling-puts-minor-league-pay-back-on-the-table [https://perma.cc/749U-HMFL]
(referring to choice-of-law issues).
41. See id. (noting SAPA was passed as part of federal spending bill). “Any
employee employed to play baseball who is compensated pursuant to a contract
that provides for a weekly salary for services performed during the league’s cham-
pionship season (but not spring training or the off season) at a rate that is not less
than a weekly salary equal to the minimum wage under section 206(a) of this title
for a workweek of 40 hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee
devotes to baseball related activities.” Id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19) (detailing
amendment exempting minor league players from FLSA); Save America’s Pastime
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 1126 (containing application of FLSA to minor
league players). But see Grow, supra note 34, at 1038 (arguing SAPA “makes it R
substantially less likely that the Senne plaintiffs will be able to force MLB to signifi-
cantly modify its treatment of minor league players through the suit”).
42. See Zagger, supra note 40 (“The key to this is the reliance on state laws R
rather than on the federal laws, which seem to have been rendered virtually
unusable.”).  While Plaintiffs’ claims regarding future wages under the FLSA might
be moot, SAPA “is not retroactive, however, meaning that players could still seek
damages from the period before it went into effect.”  Zach Spedden, Appeals Court




43. See Defs.’ Answer to the Second Am. Compl. at 72, Senne v. Office of the
Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14-cv-00608-JCS, 014 WL 10726660 (N.D. Cal. May 22,
2014) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1)-(3) (2020)) (asserting Plaintiffs FLSA claims
barred by seasonal worker status exemption); see also Spedden, supra note 42 (re- R
porting MLB claiming minor league jobs are “akin to seasonal apprenticeships”).
44. See Spedden, supra note 42 (providing MLB’s reaction to requests for R
higher wages).
7
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B. Procedural Posture: The Innings Leading Up to the Circuit
Court
In Senne, forty-five current and former MiLB players banded
together to demand the MLB finally step up to the plate.45  Plain-
tiffs challenged the MLB’s wage and labor practices as archaic and
described Defendants as either members or leaders of the “cartel”
known as the MLB.46  Plaintiffs’ key piece of evidence supporting
this claim was the poverty-level pay of $12,000 that an average MiLB
player makes per season.47  The former and current MiLB players
alleged that “the American tradition of baseball collides with a tra-
dition far less benign: the exploitation of workers.”48
In May 2015, Plaintiffs filed their second amended consoli-
dated class action complaint in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.49  Plaintiffs alleged wage-and-
hour claims under the laws of eight states and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA).50  In October 2015, after the district court pre-
liminarily certified the FLSA collective, notice was sent to
approximately 15,000 current and former minor league players.51
In 2016, Defendants moved to decertify the FLSA collective
and exclude Plaintiffs’ expert survey, while Plaintiffs moved to cer-
tify a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (“Rule 23(b)(2)“) class and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (“Rule 23(b)(3)”) classes.52  The district court de-
nied certification for the Rule 23(b)(3) classes due to failure to sat-
45. See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir.
2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 1, 2020) (No. 19-1339) (noting MLB Commis-
sioner, Bud Selig, and twenty-two MLB franchises as co-defendants).  Plaintiffs also
brought state wage-and-hour claims as well. See id. (stating wage and overtime vio-
lations included: California, Florida, Arizona, North Carolina, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, and Oregon).
46. See Second Consolidated Am. Compl., supra note 31, at 4 (“The organiza- R
tion traces its roots to the nineteenth century. Unfortunately for many of its em-
ployees, its wage and labor practices remain stuck there.”).
47. See Yagman, supra note 35 (reporting three class action suits attempting R
“to reverse the tide of Minor League Baseball’s unlivable wages”); see also Broshuis,
supra note 4, at 93 (comparing MLB and MiLB wage growth from 1976 to 2010). R
48. Senne, 934 F.3d at 923 (suggesting MLB’s unfair abuse of minor league
players); see also J.J. Cooper, MLB Proposal Would Eliminate 42 Minor League Teams,
BASEBALL AMERICA (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/
mlb-floats-proposal-that-would-eliminate-42-minor-league-teams/ [https://
perma.cc/TBB5-ZMWG] (reporting Plaintiffs “contend they should have been
paid for their time in spring training and extended spring training”).
49. See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 530 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (summarizing background of case).
50. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 924-25 (summarizing procedural history of case).
51. See id. at 924 (noting 2,200 players who received notice opted in).
52. See Senne, 315 F.R.D. at 529–61 (summarizing procedural history of case).
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isfy the predominance requirement.53  The district court also
decertified the FLSA collective finding that collective members
were not similarly situated.54  Further, the district court denied De-
fendants’ motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert survey (the “Main
Survey”), finding that Defendants’ challenges were “better left to a
jury to evaluate.”55  Lastly, the district court denied certification of
the Rule 23(b)(2) class for a lack of standing.56
On reconsideration, Plaintiffs argued they could meet Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement and FLSA’s similarly situ-
ated requirement through “a combination of the use of representa-
tive evidence and application of the so-called ‘continuous workday’
rule.”57  Subsequently, the district court recertified the FLSA collec-
tive and certified a California 23(b)(3) class.58  Also on reconsidera-
tion, the district court denied certification of Plaintiffs’ Arizona,
Florida, and (b)(2) classes for predominance concerns.59
On petition, the Ninth Circuit considered “whether these mi-
nor league players may properly bring their wage-and-hour claims
53. See id. at 585 (relying on choice-of-law issues and plaintiffs failing to be
“similarly situated” for denying certification).
54. See id. at 586 (stating adjudicating FLSA on collective basis would be
“unmanageable”).
55. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 925 (finding Main Survey admissible).  Defendants’
moved for the district court to exclude the Main Survey because it failed to provide
data on “the kinds of activities they performed at the facilities, or how much time
they spent performing particular activities.” Id. at 926 (arguing even if Main Sur-
vey admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., it fails to meet pre-
dominance and similarly situated requirements).  However, the district court
concluded, since Defendants’ challenges went to the significance of the Main Sur-
vey and not its admissibility, Plaintiffs were permitted to use the Main Survey in
combination with other evidence, such as team schedules, testimony, and payroll
data, to meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and FLSA’s simi-
larly situated. See id. (noting Defendants not precluded from challenging Main
Survey’s sufficiency on summary judgement and/or at trial).
56. See id. at 925 (reasoning Plaintiffs were all former, not current, players).
Since all of the named Plaintiffs were former minor league players, the district
court found, they failed to show any likelihood of future harm from Defendants,
and therefore, lacked standing to seek injunctive relief for the Rule 23(b)(2) clas-
ses. See Senne, 315 F.R.D. at 584 (finding Plaintiffs failed to meet requirements for
Rule 23(b)(2) certification).  In an attempt to cure this deficiency, Plaintiffs re-
quested permission to add current minor league players to their complaint; how-
ever, the court denied this request. See id. at 585 n. 17 (finding Plaintiffs failure to
satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) prohibited such a remedy).
57. Senne, 934 F.3d at 925 (noting Plaintiffs’ main representative evidence in-
volved expert survey titled “Main Survey”).
58. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 926 (noting FLSA collective was narrowed down).
59. See id. (holding “choice-of-law concerns defeated predominance for the
Arizona and Florida classes and undermined ‘cohesiveness’ for the (b)(2) class”);
see also Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 WL
5973487 at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (granting Plaintiffs’ motion to certify for
appeal and Defendants’ motion to stay).
9
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on a collective and class-wide basis.”60  The Ninth Circuit held in
favor of Plaintiffs by expanding the scope of class action require-
ments.61  The Ninth Circuit’s decision marked a significant win for
minor league players by clearing the path for Plaintiffs to pursue
the case as a certified class on remand.62  This decision is only the
beginning of what could be a long litigious road for the forty-five
named plaintiffs in the case; however, Senne is significant because it
initiated a much needed dialogue regarding the substandard treat-
ment of MiLB players.63  The MLB has since moved for the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to be stayed pending the filing and disposition of
a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.64
However, the Supreme Court has since denied the MLB’s petition,
allowing the Ninth Circuit’s class certification decision to stand and
permitting the case to move forward as a class action in trial court.65
III. BACKGROUND: WHO’S ON FIRST, WHAT’S ON SECOND
In order to fully grasp the significance of Senne, it is important
to understand the procedural intricacies of succeeding in a federal
class action.66  In addition to explaining the mechanics of a class
action, Section III also covers the relationship between the MLB
and MiLB and how this dynamic effects labor conditions for profes-
sional baseball players.67  Also in play is the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, which was recently amended with a provision specifi-
cally exempting baseball players from minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour protections.68  These developments significantly
60. Senne, 934 F.3d at 923 (stating main issue of case).
61. See Spedden, supra note 42 (detailing results of appeal). R
62. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 950 (holding certification “is consistent with the
‘great public policy’ embodied by the FLSA”).
63. See Spedden, supra note 42 (arguing MLB “should be complying with R
those laws just like Walmart is complying with those laws” (quoting Garrett
Broshuis, one attorney for minor league players)).
64. See Zachary Zagger, Minor League Wage Suit Halted for MLB’s High Court Bid,
LAW360 (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1234193 [https://
perma.cc/VSY7-8LF3] (detailing MLB’s appeal to Supreme Court).
65. See Kansas City Royals Baseball v. Senne, No. 19-1339, 2020 WL 5882289,
at *1 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
66. For further discussion of class and collective actions, see infra notes
70–110 and accompanying text. R
67. For further discussion of the significant governing bodies in the MLB and
the MiLB, see infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text.  For further discussion R
of labor regulations in professional baseball, see infra notes 114–119 and accompa- R
nying text.
68. See Maury Brown, Court Ruling Allows Minor League Baseball Players to Seek
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impacted Plaintiffs’ strategy in focusing on state laws to overcome
antitrust exemptions long enjoyed by baseball owners and
executives.69
A. Class and Collective Actions
1. Choice-of Law Issues & Predominance
Multistate class actions implicate substantive law of multiple ju-
risdictions, thus requiring a district court to utilize the choice-of-law
rules of the forum state to decide what law applies.70  Choice-of-law
conflicts do not preclude a 23(b)(3) action; however, when there is
a potential for variations in applicable state law,  understanding
which state’s law applies is important before making predominance
determinations.71  A class action brought in a federal district court
located in California would therefore apply California law, unless a
party litigant objects by invoking foreign state law.72
In California, when a party invokes foreign state law, that party
has  the burden of satisfying California’s three-step governmental
interest test.73  First, a court must determine whether the relevant
laws differ, and if so, whether a “true” conflict exists.74  Finally, a
court must determine “which state’s interest would be more im-
paired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other
G9HH] (detailing 2018 law exempting baseball players from FLSA protections); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19) (2018) (codifying Save America’s Pastime Act).
69. For further discussion of baseball’s infamous antitrust exemption, see in-
fra notes 120-129 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the MLB’s R
reorganization proposal for the minor league, see infra notes 130-143 and accom- R
panying text.
70. See ANDREW S. TULUMELLO & GEOFFREY C. WEIEN, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
TO CLASS ACTIONS 621 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., American Bar Association (2010))
(discussing choice-of-law issues in multistate class actions); see also Senne v. Kan.
City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Jan. 1, 2020) (No. 19-1339) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941)) (detailing choice-of-law analysis).
71. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.
2001) (stressing varying state laws may defeat predominance).  The Ninth Circuit
has expressed its concern with the impact of choice-of-law analysis in national con-
sumer class actions. See e.g. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir.
2012) (regarding automobile sales in forty-four different jurisdictions).
72. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 928 (citing In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.,
926 F.3d 539, 561 (9th Cir. 2019)) (detailing procedure when party litigant invokes
foreign state law); see also Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496–97 (delineating choice-of-law
standard).
73. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 928 (explaining burden shifting process).
74. See id. at 929 (citing Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 244-47 (Cal.
2011)) (explaining first two steps of California’s governmental interest test); see
also Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590 (explaining differences in state law are material when
they make difference in litigation).
11
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state.”75  In Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,76 the California Supreme Court
held California labor laws applied to both residents and non-re-
sidents performing work within California’s state borders.77 Sulli-
van also applied California’s three-step governmental interest test
for conflicts-of-law.78
2. Rule 23: Certification of Class Actions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits representative par-
ties to pursue claims on behalf of a greater group of people.79  So
long as the plaintiff can demonstrate “(1) numerosity; (2) common-
ality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation,” a class ac-
tion may proceed beyond this primary judicial hurdle.80  After
establishing these Rule 23(a) prerequisites, a plaintiff must show
that the proposed class falls within one of the three different types
of classes under Rule 23(b).81
a. 23(b)(2)’s Injunctive Class
Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) requires the party opposing
the class, typically the Defendant, to have “acted or refused to act
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.”82  Injunctive class certification, under Rule
23(b)(2), is granted when the claim involves “a pattern or practice
that is generally applicable to the class as a whole.”83  Some courts
75. Senne, 934 F.3d at 930 (explaining third step of California’s governmental
interest test); see also Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922
(2006) (detailing California’s three-step governmental interest test).
76. 254 P.3d 237 (Cal. 2011).
77. See id. at 240-41 (concluding California law applied as matter of statutory
construction). Sullivan involved non-resident employees of a California corpora-
tion who worked primarily in Colorado and Arizona, but also worked in California.
See id. at 243 (noting work performed in California lasted for “entire days or weeks”
at time).
78. See Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 244-47 (outlining analysis of governmental inter-
est test).
79. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 927 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)) (discussing class
certification analysis).
80. Id. (listing Rule 23(a)’s four requirements).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (providing three different types of classes); see also
Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013) (delineating rule
for 23(b)).
82. Senne, 934 F.3d at 928 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(2)) (discussing injunctive relief class).
83. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Parsons v.
Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 689 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating Rule 23(b)(2) classes not limited
to civil rights context).
12
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have interpreted 23(b)(2)’s “generally applicable” language as a
trigger for a cohesiveness requirement, and subsequently have
treated this class type requirement similar to Rule 23(b)(3)’s pre-
dominance inquiry.84  Other courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, re-
ject the triggering of a cohesiveness requirement for 23(b)(2)
classes, stating those courts “demonstrate a fundamental misunder-
standing of the rule.”85  In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,86 the Su-
preme Court clarified this divergence in interpretation of 23(b)(2),
holding Rule 23(b)(2) “does not authorize class certification when
each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunc-
tion or declaratory judgment against the defendant.”87
b. 23(b)(3)’s Predominance Requirement
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is merited if “questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any ques-
tions impacting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudi-
cating the controversy.”88  Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry
“focuses on ‘the relationship between the common and individual
issues’ and ‘tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive
to warrant adjudication by representation.’”89  In Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo,90 the Supreme Court clarified that even if certain mat-
ters must be tried separately according to individual class members,
a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class may be certified as long as “one or
more of the central issues in the action are common to the class
and can be said to predominate.”91  Therefore, courts must “take a
close look at whether common questions predominate over individ-
84. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 937 n.14 (discussing similarity between cohesiveness
and predominance).
85. Walters, 145 F.3d at 1047 (holding “[e]ven if some class members have not
been injured by the challenged practice, a class may nevertheless be appropriate”).
“Although common issues must predominate for class certification under Rule
23(b)(3), no such requirement exists under 23(b)(2).” Id. (rejecting predomi-
nance requirement for 23(b)(2) classes).
86. 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011).
87. Id. at 360 (“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declar-
atory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.”).
88. Senne, 934 F.3d at 927 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)) (noting
23(b)(3)’s requirements).
89. Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998)).
90. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
91. Id. at 1045 (quoting 7AA C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778 (3d ed. 2005)).
13
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ual ones to ensure that individual questions do not overwhelm
questions common to the class.”92
i. Representative Evidence
Differences among employees rarely defeat predominance in
employment cases, “so long as liability arises from a common prac-
tice or policy of an employer.”93  In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens,94 the
Supreme Court established the burden-shifting framework for
when the employer kept inaccurate or inadequate records:
[W]e hold that an employee has carried out his burden if
he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he
was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient
evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a
matter of just and reasonable inference.  The burden then
shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of
the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to
negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn
from the employee’s evidence.95
This burden-shifting framework relieved employees from po-
tential obstacles in pursuing a wage-and-hour claim if their em-
ployer failed to maintain adequate records.96  In Tyson, the
Supreme Court expanded this framework by allowing a representa-
tive sample to establish hours worked in a class action,  as long as
the sample “could have sustained a reasonable jury finding as to
hours worked in each employee’s individual action.”97  For pur-
92. Senne, 934 F.3d at 927 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (discussing whether pre-
dominance requirement satisfied).  Rule 23(b)(3) “asks whether the common, ag-
gregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the
non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.” See also Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at
1045 (quoting 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:49 (5th ed. 2012)).
93. Senne, 934 F.3d at 938 (quoting 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 23:33 (5th
ed. 2012)). But see In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d
953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating blanket corporate policies do not guarantee satis-
faction of predominance but “often bear heavily on questions of predominance
and superiority”).
94. 328 U.S. 680, 687-88 (1946).
95. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687-88 (rejecting “notion allowing approximate
damages in such situations would be unfair”); see also Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045-48
(applying Mt. Clemens to state wage-and-hour claims).
96. See Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687–88 (requiring employers to provide evi-
dence in rebuttal).
97. Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1046-47 (affirming class and collective certifications).
Even where “‘reasonable minds may differ’ about whether representative evidence
is sufficiently probative of the requirements for liability for a particular cause of
14
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poses of class certification, Tyson permitted a class of employees to
use a representative sample to “fill an evidentiary gap created by the
employer’s failure to keep adequate records.”98
ii. “Continuous Workday” Rule
In 1947, the Department of Labor (DOL) first adopted the
continuous workday rule, which is still in effect today.99  The con-
tinuous workday rule presumes that once the workday is triggered,
an employee performs compensable work throughout the rest of
the day until the employee completes their last principal activity.100
In IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,101 the Supreme Court interpreted the contin-
uous workday to include “any activity that is ‘integral and indispen-
sable’ to principal activities, even if performed outside of a
scheduled shift.”102
3. Similarly Situated Under FLSA
Under the FLSA, employees are permitted to bring lawsuits on
behalf of “themselves and other employees similarly situated.”103
The FLSA’s similarly situated requirement lacks any established def-
inition and, as a result, two different approaches exist in the court
system.104  The minority approach treats a FLSA collective as an
“opt-in analogue to a Rule 23(b)(3) class,” meaning a collective
must satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements of numerosity, common-
ality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority.105  Alter-
natively, the majority approach involves “a flexible inquiry into the
factual differences between the party plaintiffs and the desirability
action . . . that question is to be resolved by the jury, not at the class certification
stage.” Senne, 934 F.3d. at 940 (quoting Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049).
98. Wayne D. Garris Jr., Denial of Class Certification Reversed in Major Win for
Minor League Baseball Players, WOLTERS KLUWER, http://www.employmentlawdaily.
com/index.php/news/denial-of-class-certification-reversed-in-major-win-for-mi-
nor-league-baseball-players/ [https://perma.cc/P6Q3-TF36] (last visited Mar. 21,
2020) (detailing Tyson’s treatment of representative evidence).
99. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 28, (2005) (noting DOL’s adoption of
Court’s interpretation of continuous workday rule); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b)
(defining continuous workday).
100. See Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 28 (explaining continuous workday rule).
101. 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
102. Senne, 934 F.3d at  941 (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 32-37) (expanding
definition of continuous workday).
103. Id. at 947 (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018)) (ex-
plaining FLSA collective actions).
104. See Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 111-16 (9th Cir.
2018) (referring to minority and majority approaches).
105. Id. (stating no circuit court has adopted minority approach in full).
15
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of collective treatment.”106  A district court following this majority
approach “focuses on points of potential factual or legal dissimilarity
between party plaintiffs,” using a three-prong test.107  In Campbell v.
City of Los Angeles,108 the Ninth Circuit rejected both tests for simi-
larly situated and established a novel approach to FLSA collective
certification.109  Under the Campbell standard, plaintiffs deemed
similarly situated in a FLSA collective must “share a similar issue of
law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims.”110
B. Professional Baseball Labor: Majors v. Minors
The MLB is comprised of thirty teams, which are evenly di-
vided among two leagues, the American and the National.111  Mi-
nor league players are professional athletes, contracted with the
MLB, which leads many fans to improperly assume that the MLB
and the MiLB work as one entity.112  While the PBA binds the MLB
106. Id. at 1113 (citing Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233,
1260 n.38. (11th Cir. 2008)) (referring to test as “ad hoc” test).
107. Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1113–16 (declining adoption due to “ad hoc” test’s
two major flaws).  A district court following the three-prong test considers first, any
“disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs,” second,
“the various defenses available to defendants which appear to be individual to each
plaintiff,” and third, “fairness and procedural considerations.” Id. at 1113 (quot-
ing Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001)) (outlining
considerations involved in three-prong test).
108. 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018).
109. See id. at 1111 (referring to inconsistencies and improper treatment from
prior similarly situated tests).
110. Id. at 1117 (holding dissimilarities in other respects should not defeat
collective treatment).
111. See MLB Team Contact Information, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://
www.mlb.com/team [https://perma.cc/8MNE-5JRG] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)
(listing all thirty MLB teams).  The MLB is led by a commissioner, who is elected
by the owners of the thirty MLB teams. See also Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Pro-
motes Selig’s Deputy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
08/15/sports/baseball/MLB-Commissioner-Rob-Manfred-Tom-Werner-Tim-Bros-
nan.html [https://perma.cc/LK56-YAXG] (announcing election of MLB’s tenth
commissioner).
112. See J.J. Cooper, A Complete History of The Working Agreement Between Major
and Minor Leagues ,  BASEBALL AMERICA (Oct. 18, 2019), https://
www.baseballamerica.com/stories/a-complete-history-of-the-working-agreement-
between-major-and-minor-leagues/ [https://perma.cc/YEQ8-E3GC] (explaining
common misconception of relationship between MLB and MiLB); see also See Who
We Are, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, https://www.milb.com/about/ [https://
perma.cc/U3U8-N6UK] (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (reporting MiLB consists of 160
teams spread across  17 leagues). “The current minor league classification system
divides leagues into one of five classes, those being Triple-A (AAA), Double-A
(AA), Class A (Single-A or A), Class A Short Season, and Rookie.” Overview of Base-




Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\28-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 17 27-JAN-21 15:24
2021] SHUT UP AND PITCH 69
and the MiLB together, neither organization negotiates on behalf
of minor league players’ interests.113
1. Uniform Player Contract (UPC)
Minor leaguers are governed by the Major League Rules
(MLRs), despite not being able to enjoy  the protections the
MLBPA affords major league players.114  Under the MLRs, all mi-
nor leaguers are required to sign a seven-year Uniform Player Con-
tract (UPC), which dictates the minimum salary for minor
leaguers.115  Together, baseball’s antitrust exemption and the UPC
place major constraints on minor league players’ contractual
freedom.116
During the regular season and postseason, MLB teams are per-
mitted to maintain a forty-man major league reserve list; however,
outside this time period, MLB teams are only allowed to maintain
twenty-six active players.117  While players who are listed on the
forty-man roster are eligible for membership in the MLBPA, the
remaining players in the minors are left to fend for themselves.118
As a result, minor leaguers hesitate and refrain from voicing com-
plaints about the minor league system out of fear of jeopardizing
their chances of being listed on an MLB team’s active roster.119
after Sports Advisory Group] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (detailing subdivisions of
Class A include Class A Advanced, and Class A).
113. See Cooper, supra note 112 (reasoning for poor treatment of minor R
leaguers).
114. See Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, Official Baseball Rules, MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL MLR 3(b) (2019) [hereinafter Major League Rules] https://
d39ba378-ae47-400386d3147e4fa6e51b.filesusr.com/ugd/b0a4c2_6e1db097aef
e47d5b09187096d45fdee.pdf [https://perma.cc/88MM-6HVL] (showing rules
governing American professional baseball); see also Sports Advisory Group, supra
note 112 (explaining minor league players must sign player development contracts R
(PDC) which is the standard agreement dictated by MLB).
115. See Major League Rules, supra note 114, at 3(c) (listing first-year player R
contract terms).
116. See David Williams, Major League Baseball’s Indentured Class: Why the Major
League Baseball Players Association Should Include Minor League Players, 53 U.S.F. L.
REV. 515, 532 (2019) (concluding changes to way MLB exploits minor league play-
ers must occur in order for minor leaguers to achieve proper treatment).
117. See David Adler, These Are the Rule Changes for 2020 Season, MLB (Feb. 14,
2020), https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-rule-changes-for-2020-season [https://
perma.cc/LX49-P9SX] (outlining rule changes for 2020 season regarding roster
size); see also Sports Advisory Group, supra note 112 (explaining fifteen players are R
either placed on injured list or are brought back down to minor leagues).
118. See Sports Advisory Group, supra note 112 (reiterating how minor league R
players are unrepresented).
119. See Hayhurst, supra note 26 (explaining why few minor league players R
openly object to poor treatment).
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2. Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
Federal antitrust laws are the bedrock on which American eco-
nomics is based.120  Antitrust laws apply to any business involved in
“interstate commerce;” however, professional sports enjoy a surpris-
ing exemption from these laws.121  Baseball, in particular, “best ex-
emplifies the implementation, application, and interpretation of
the antitrust exemption issues.”122  In 1922, a unanimous Supreme
Court established baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust laws
with the case Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l
120. See Claudia Catalano, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Professional Sports, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 1, 1 (noting federal antitrust laws promote
competition).  Massive growth of corporations in America spurred the enactment
of federal antitrust laws in the late 1800s. See JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 9.01 (2d ed. 2020) (noting concerns of
corporate control over American economy as impetus for antitrust laws).  In 1890,
the Sherman Act was passed, to prevent monopolization within the free markets,
serving as a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/A8N2-9MZG] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020)
(noting Sherman Act as first antitrust law passed in United States); see also KALI-
NOWSKI ET AL., supra, § 9.02 (discussing passage of Sherman Act as response to
industrialization in United States).  Soon thereafter, in 1914, the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Clayton Act were passed. See id. § 9.03 (explaining Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act created FTC).  The Federal Trade Commission Act
outlaws “unfair methods of competition,” while the Clayton Act “addresses specific
practices that the Sherman Act does not clearly prohibit, such as mergers and in-
terlocking directorates.” Id. (summarizing interaction of core federal antitrust
laws).  These three core federal antitrust laws all have “the same basic objective: to
protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there
are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and
keep quality up.” Id. (noting all three core antitrust laws are still in effect today).
“In addition to these federal statutes, most states have antitrust laws that are en-
forced by state attorneys general or private plaintiffs.” Id. (acknowledging many
states modeled state antitrust statutes on federal antitrust laws).
121. See Baseball Antitrust Exemption with Gordon Hylton, Sports Law Biz Podcast
(Sept. 14, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes) (discussing impact of baseball’s anti-
trust exemption).  Some have argued sports teams are “more like civic organiza-
tions than businesses” and as such, sports teams should be exempt from complying
with federal antitrust laws. See Antitrust Exemption, https://antitrustlaws.org/anti-
trust-exemption.html https://perma.cc/D4TK-AQ62] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020)
(“Because many of the laws were created prior to million dollar salaries and tele-
vised events, this made sense and an exemption was allowed.”).  “The fact that
competitive sports cannot exist without some degree of cooperation between com-
peting teams, however, has played a role in the development of general antitrust
principles.” ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 2-14(I) (8th ed. 2017) (indicating
business of sports, rather than sports industry, is subject to general antitrust
principles).
122. Howard Bartee, Jr., The Role of Antitrust Laws in the Professional Sports In-
dustry from a Financial Perspective, SPORT J., Mar. 2005, at 3 (examining how antitrust
laws shaped financial operations of professional sports industry).
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Baseball Clubs.123  After going bankrupt, the owner of the Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore filed claims against the National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, alleging that defendants “conspired
to monopolize the base ball business” which purportedly violated
antitrust laws.124  However, the Supreme Court held that the base-
ball leagues were not engaged in interstate commerce and there-
fore were not subject to antitrust laws.125  Consequently, Federal
Baseball established an unprecedented loophole for professional
baseball, which remained the law of the land for the next seventy
years.126  Players attempted to chip away at baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption following the Federal Baseball decision; however, change
did not occur until Congress stepped up to bat.127  In the late
123. See 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding interstate commerce merely incidental
to baseball).  The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Baseball stands “as one of the
worst reasoned decisions ever.”  Craig Calcaterra, Happy Birthday to Baseball’s Anti-
trust Exemption, NBC SPORTS (May 29, 2019), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2019/
05/29/happy-birthday-to-baseballs-antitrust-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/
6QDS-WEB2] (suggesting Supreme Court came to its decision “because Justice
Holmes really, really just wanted the baseball owners to win, logic and the law be
damned”).
124. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. at 207 (filing antitrust action
against National League).  The Sherman Act “is a federal law which prevents busi-
nesses from conspiring with one another in an effort to thwart competition, agree-
ing to fix prices and otherwise undermining the market, which might hurt
consumers.” See Calcaterra, supra note 123 (explaining  Sherman Act “can only R
apply to business that engages in ‘interstate commerce’”).
125. See Fed. Baseball, Inc., 259 U.S. at 209 (citing Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, 655 (1895)) (“[T]he transport is a mere incident, not the essential
thing.”).  In 1922, baseball was at the center of American culture and despite oper-
ating as a money-making business, the Supreme Court at the time established a
major exemption to antitrust laws for professional baseball. See Antitrust Exemption,
supra note 121 (referring to non-statutory exemption to antitrust laws for base- R
ball).  Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
articulated “the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce
free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not
enough to change the character of the business.” Id. at 209 (affirming court of
appeals decision).
126. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 121, § 2-14(I)(2) (explain- R
ing Supreme Court’s affirming of Fed. Baseball  in 1953 and 1972).  In support of
upholding baseball’s antitrust exemption, the Supreme Court pointed first to Con-
gress’s “positive inaction” in allowing the exemption from Fed. Baseball to continue,
second to concerns overturning Fed. Baseball would cause confusion an retroactivity
issues, and third that a change in the exemption requires legislative action that “by
its nature, is only prospective in operation.” Id. (explaining Supreme Court’s rea-
soning for continuing baseball’s antitrust exemption).
127. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26(b) (2019)) [hereinafter Curt Flood Act]
(subjecting employment of MLB players to antitrust laws). See generally Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (involving lawsuits brought by MLB players against
MLB); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (arguing against
MLB’s reserve clause as restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws).  In 1953,
professional baseball player George Toolson brought claims against the New York
19
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1990s, new rights were carved out for MLB players under federal
antitrust laws with the Curt Flood Act of 1998.128  While the Act
served as a momentous victory for MLB players, these rights only
applied to athletes competing in the MLB, leaving MiLB players
defenseless.129
C. MLB’s Reorganization Plan for MiLB Teams
During a virtual meeting on August 27, 2020, the MLB
presented the MiLB with a proposal for a new minor league system
for 2021 and beyond.130  The MLB’s proposal came just thirty-five
days before the PBA between the MLB and MiLB was set to ex-
pire.131 If adopted, this proposal is reported to be the “most signifi-
cant change to Minor League Baseball in at least a half century and
arguably ever.”132  Notably, the proposal could potentially strip
forty-two MiLB teams of their affiliation with MLB clubs.133  While
Yankees, challenging the MLB’s reserve clause. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (re-
questing abandonment of Federal Baseball).  Ultimately, the Supreme Court
found for the MLB, holding if antitrust laws were to subsequently apply to profes-
sional baseball, legislative action would be required. See id. (reasoning Congres-
sional inaction affirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption).  Almost two decades later,
seven-time gold glove winner and two-time World Series Champion, Curt Flood
took a stab at securing rights for professional baseball players. See Flood, 407 U.S. at
264–66 (detailing procedural history).  Flood ultimately lost his challenge to the
MLB’s reserve clause due to Congress’ “positive inaction” to disapprove of base-
ball’s longstanding antitrust exemption legislatively. See id. at 284 (adhering to
fifty-year precedent).
128. See Curt Flood Act at 2824-26 (“It is the purpose of this legislation to state
that major league baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws . . . that
major league baseball players will have the same rights under the antitrust laws as
do other professional athletes . . . .”).  Proponents of the bill demand Congress
“finally steps up to the plate and ends baseball’s antitrust exemption.” 143 Cong.
Rec. E8 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1997) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (arguing professional
baseball as sole industry in United States exempt from antitrust laws and immune
from alternative regulatory supervision).
129. See Williams, supra note 116, at 535 (referring to legal deficiencies). R
130. See J.J. Cooper, MLB Lays Out Proposal to Run Minor League Baseball, BASE-
BALL AMERICA (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/mlb-lays-
out-proposal-to-run-minor-league-baseball/ [https://perma.cc/4U68-7PAT] (re-
porting ongoing negotiations between MLB and MiLB).
131. See id. (indicating agreement discussions coming close to deadline).
132. See id. (detailing significance of MLB’s proposal); see also Cooper, supra
note 48 (analyzing status of MLB and MiLB’s negotiations). R
133. See Dan Gartland, MLB Proposes Drastic Restructuring of Minor League Sys-
tem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.si.com/mlb/2019/10/18/
mlb-minor-league-system-changes-proposal [https://perma.cc/P2SM-XYWX]
(showing impact on MiLB players as well as local communities where cut teams are
based).  “At the core of the negotiations, MLB is looking to dramatically improve
Minor League Baseball’s stadium facilities as well as take control over how the
minor leagues are organized as far as affiliations and the geography of leagues.”
Cooper, supra note 48 (discussing MLB’s intentions in drastically altering land- R
scape of MiLB).
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PBA negotiations remain in the early stages, the MLB seems fo-
cused on implementing an overhaul of the minor leagues, despite
public disapproval.134
The MLB’s proposal to eliminate forty-two affiliated minor
league franchises for the 2021 season would be detrimental to the
small towns where those teams are located.135  As a result of this
threat, local officials have banded together to take on the big
leagues.136  Although many MiLB teams will survive the proposal,
those survivors will undoubtedly be in a worse position.137  In an
attempt to push back against the MLB’s efforts, twenty-five mayors
from across the country formed a task force to “to preserve the eco-
nomic and social opportunities available for teams in minor league
communities.”138  Local community leaders suggest there are nu-
merous, less drastic, solutions the MLB could consider.139  These
134. See Cooper, supra note 48 (“From the perspective of MLB clubs, our prin- R
cipal goals are upgrading the minor league facilities that we believe have inade-
quate standards for potential MLB players, improving the working conditions for
MiLB players, including their compensation, improving transportation and hotel
accommodations, providing better geographic affiliations between major league
clubs and their affiliates, as well as better geographic lineups of leagues to reduce
player travel.” (quoting Dan Halem, MLB Deputy Commissioner)).
135. See Herald Editorial Board, MLB Needn’t Play Hardball with Minor League
Teams, HERALD NET (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/edito-
rial-mlb-neednt-play-hardball-with-minor-league-teams/ [https://perma.cc/
D3WR-KYHZ] (“[A] minor league team is often seen as a major league part of a
city’s culture and quality of life.”).
136. See Jake Seiner, Michigan Mayors Join New Task Force to Oppose Major League
Baseball Minor League Contraction, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://
www.crainsdetroit.com/sports/michigan-mayors-join-new-task-force-oppose-major-
league-baseball-minor-league-contraction [https://perma.cc/ED2C-C3KV] (advo-
cating on behalf of small communities).
137. See Herald Editorial Board, supra note 135 (making surviving minor R
league teams “wonder if they could face contraction the next time the agreement
is negotiated”).
138. Derrek Asberry, Charleston, Columbia Mayors Join National Effort to ‘Save
Minor League Baseball, ’ POST & COURIER (Jan. 22, 2020), https://
www.postandcourier.com/sports/charleston-columbia-mayors-join-national-effort-
to-save-minor-league/article_c47a4b88-3d23-11ea-9cd0-479b4cbb2c68.html
[https://perma.cc/5R3M-JHV8] (“It’s more about providing some leadership . . .
and helping preserve minor league baseball, which is family-friendly, affordable
fun that 40 million Americans enjoyed last year.”) (quoting Columbia Mayor Steve
Benjamin); see also Jake Seiner, Mayors Launch Task Force to Oppose Minor League
Contraction ,  ASS’D PRESS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://apnews.com/
a48259eb14071493c4e0167ebe27a4ca [https://perma.cc/74KF-756T] (“All of us
understand this plan is a major league error.” (quoting Chattanooga Mayor Andy
Berke)).
139. See Herald Editorial Board, supra note 135 (suggesting refrain from elim- R
inating baseball in forty-two communities across the country). But see Seiner, supra
note 138 (“I think the question there becomes who should bear all of the costs R
associated with the player-related improvements that we think need to be made in
the minor league system.” (quoting MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred)).
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leaders are calling on the MLB to remember “major and minor
leagues need each other, as much as America still needs
baseball.”140
While the MiLB has long been unsupported when dealing with
the MLB, it is finally gaining the necessary support to stand up for
its players’ rights.141  Minor league teams have also gained support
from Congress, which has partnered with a local community leader
task force to take on the MLB.142  The key reason for local and
federal partnership is that “[m]any minor league facilities are ei-
ther publicly owned or have been supported by tax dollars.”143
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT CALLS FOUL BALL
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit called “a great number of balls
and strikes.”144  The court considered the district court’s certifica-
140. Herald Editorial Board, supra note 135 (arguing why major leagues have R
interest in supporting minor leaguers); see also Mike Anthony, Blumenthal Makes
Necessary Noise as Part of Norwich Fight to Keep Minor League Baseball, HARTFORD COU-
RANT (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.courant.com/sports/hc-sp-norwich-baseball-
blumenthal-column-20191229-zpvi5lbqmjgwhlmmg5mixbzfla-story.html [https://
perma.cc/Q5XZ-ND32] (“This fight . . . is about the fundamentals of community
and what makes America the greatest nation in the history of the world.” (quoting
Senator Richard Blumenthal)).
141. See Asberry, supra note 138 (quoting mayoral task force on advocating R
“on behalf of the communities that stand to be most harmed” by the proposal).
“With this proposal, MLB is willing to break the hearts of dozens of communities
across the country.”  Id. (quoting Columbia Fireflies president John Katz and
Greenville Drive general manager Eric Jarinko) (referring to adverse repercus-
sions from cutting minor league teams).  The MLB needs “needs visible people to
voice the fear and anger of a baseball community that Major League Baseball views
as one of 42 inconveniences on its $11 billion money trail.”  Anthony, supra note
140 (quoting Senator Richard Blumenthal implying need for more public R
support).
142. See Seiner, supra note 138 (“Politicians have pummeled MLB over the R
plan.”).  “A bipartisan congressional task force formed last month, and Democratic
presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has criticized baseball Commissioner Rob
Manfred over the proposed cuts.” Id. (noting importance of this public support).
143. See Seiner, supra note 138 (reasoning why governmental action is appro- R
priate).  “Mayors at a news conference Wednesday in New York City were frustrated
to have been left in the dark on the . . . negotiations despite having provided
public money for stadiums in exchange for franchises that play a major role in
their communities.” Id. (arguing public leaders deserve a seat at negotiating table
with MLB since many minor league teams are subsidized by taxpayers).
144. Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.
2019) (paraphrasing Chief Justice John Roberts’ confirmation hearing about the
role of the judiciary to highlight the Ninth Circuit’s role in considering both par-
ties’ numerous legal challenges); see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of
John G. Roberts, Jr., J., D.C. Circuit) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”).
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tion of Plaintiffs’ FLSA class and California class along with its de-
nial to certify Arizona and Florida classes.145  The Ninth Circuit
ultimately held in favor of Plaintiffs and remanded the case, in-
structing that both federal and state law claims merited class certifi-
cation.146  The following subsections provide an in-depth look into
the court’s analysis and decision.147
A. Choice of Law
Defendants first objected to the district court’s application of
California law to the California class, arguing that the choice-of-law
issues defeated both predominance and adequacy for certification
of the California (b)(3) class.148  Specifically, Defendants argued
the court must conduct choice-of-law inquiries for each California
class member because most of the MLB Club affiliates are located
outside California, and numerous states have a competing interest
in regulating work performed in California.149  Defendants con-
tended Sullivan was not analogous to its case and therefore should
not dictate which state’s law applied.150  The Ninth Circuit rejected
Defendants’ contentions and affirmed the district court’s applica-
tion of California law to the California class.151  The court’s key con-
145. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 927 (introducing basis of appeal).  On petition, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the Northern District of California’s decision for abuse of
discretion. See id. at 926 (noting choice of law determinations are reviewed de
novo).  The Ninth Circuit explained the district court’s grant of class certification is
accorded “noticeably more deference” than a denial.  Id. at 926 (emphasis added)
(acknowledging distinction when appellate court reviews district court’s decision
on class certification).
146. See Brown, supra note 68 (“[T]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth R
Circuit handed a legal victory to minor league baseball players seeking wages that
would exceed the minimum by ruling that the players may proceed as a class ac-
tion lawsuit.”).  The Ninth Circuit opined “these two ‘common, aggregation-ena-
bling issues in the case are more prevalent [and] important than the non-
common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues,’ therefore making certification
appropriate.” Senne, 934 F.3d at 942 (referring to Plaintiffs’ federal and state law
claims).
147. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see infra notes
148–184 and accompanying text. R
148. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 927-28 (noting preliminary issue).  The Ninth Cir-
cuit noted its concern for the impact of choice-of-law inquiries in nationwide con-
sumer class actions and products liability cases. See id. (citing Mazza v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 585, 591-94 (9th Cir. 2012); Zinser v. Accufix Research
Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1184-90 (9th Cir. 2001)) (demonstrating concern for
choice of law issues).
149. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 930-32 (arguing California law should not apply to
entire class).
150. See id. at 930-31 (suggesting district court erred in applying Sullivan).
For further discussion of the choice-of-law analysis established by the California
Supreme Court under Sullivan, see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. R
151. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 933 (stating Defendants misread Sullivan).
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sideration in determining choice-of-law issues was that when the
employees worked in California, they did so for “entire days or
weeks” at a time.152
Utilizing California’s governmental interest analysis under Sul-
livan, the Ninth Circuit concluded “Arizona law should apply to the
work performed in Arizona, and Florida law to the work performed
in Florida.”153  Furthermore, practical considerations strongly sup-
ported an application of California law to avoid “bizarre and unten-
able” results.154  The Ninth Circuit also considered whether the
district court improperly determined that choice of law issues de-
feated predominance and adequacy for the proposed Arizona and
Florida 23(b)(3) classes.155  While the court agreed with Defend-
ants that the differences in state law were arguably “material,” ulti-
mately no true conflict existed.156
Next, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court
erred in its refusal to certify Plaintiffs’ proposed Rule 23(b)(2) Ari-
zona and Florida classes due to choice-of-law issues.157  Defendants’
used the district court’s “cohesiveness” reasoning to argue the Ari-
zona and Florida 23(b)(2) classes should not be certified.158  The
Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed this denial because the district
court improperly imposed a cohesiveness requirement that does
not exist under 23(b)(2).159  The Ninth Circuit relied on Walters v.
Reno,160 which rejected any cohesiveness inquiry for 23(b)(2) clas-
ses, in support of finding the 23(b)(2) classes should have been
granted certification.161
152. Id. at 932 (citing Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011)).
153. Id. at 933 (concluding neither of Sullivan’s limited circumstances
applied).
154. Id. at 932 (holding California law applied to California class).
155. See id. at 933 (considering whether district court erred).
156. See id. (holding Arizona and Florida law should apply to work performed
within each respective state boundary).  Both Defendants and the dissent con-
tended several states have “expressed an interest in applying their wage and hour
laws to work performed outside their state.”  Id. (arguing choice of law issues de-
feat certification).
157. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 937 (holding district court erred in denying certifi-
cation of 23(b)(2) classes).  The District Court refused to certify Plaintiffs’ Florida
and Arizona 23(b)(2) classes for unpaid work at Defendants’ training facilities in
those states because choice-of-law issues undermined cohesiveness. See id. (summa-
rizing district courts’ analysis in denying certification).
158. See id. (reviewing district court’s denial of 23(b)(2) class).
159. See id. (“Although we have never explicitly addressed whether ‘cohesive-
ness’ is required under Rule 23(b)(2), courts that have imposed such a test treat it
similarly to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry.”).
160. 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).
161. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 937-38 (remanding for consideration by district
court).  “The Ninth Circuit’s August decision said that questions about which
24
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B. Rule 23(b)(3) – Predominance Requirement
After addressing choice-of-law questions, the Ninth Circuit
turned to “the issue next up at bat,” regarding Plaintiffs’ satisfaction
of the predominance requirement for the proposed California, Ari-
zona, and Florida (b)(3) classes.162  The district court previously
held that Plaintiffs met the predominance requirement for the pro-
posed California, Florida, and Arizona (b)(3) classes “through a
combination of representative evidence and application of the
‘continuous workday’ rule.”163  In its analysis of this issue, the Ninth
Circuit explained that the “predominance requirement hinges on
the application of two longstanding wage-and-hour doctrines,” set
out by the Supreme Court in Mt. Clemens and Tyson.164
Defendants argued the district court failed to “rigorously ana-
lyze” the Main Survey Plaintiffs submitted as representative evi-
dence, as required under Tyson.165  The district court relied upon
states’ labor laws applied to which players could be sidestepped by simply applying
the laws of the state where the players are practicing and playing ball.”  Ryan Boy-
sen, MLB Seeks Justices’ Input on Minor League Wage Class Cert., LAW360 (Jan. 10,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1233071/mlb-seeks-justices-input-on-mi-
nor-league-wage-class-cert [https://perma.cc/9EYN-4FDT] (reporting MLB appeal
to Supreme Court for review of this holding).  “[M]any of the baseball players
suing the league allegedly arrive early or stay late at the ballpark to eat, watch
television or practice in the batting cages when they’re less crowded, among other
things.” Id. (detailing varied player schedules).
162. Senne, 934 F.3d. at 938 (whether “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3))).
163. Id. (focusing on Plaintiffs’ representative evidence).  Class certification
under Rule 23(b)(3) is merited only if the district court finds the proposed class
meets both predominance and superiority requirements. See id. at 927 (detailing re-
quirements for (b)(3) certification).
164. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 927 (setting forth analysis for predominance).  For
further discussion of the longstanding wage-and-hour doctrines, related to pre-
dominance, established by the Supreme Court in Mt. Clemens and Tyson, see supra
notes 94-98 and accompanying text.  Predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) requires R
courts to consider “whether the common, aggregation-enabling issues in the case
are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating,
individual issues.” Id. (quoting Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036,
1049 (2016)) (distinguishing between common and non-common issues relevant
to predominance).  The Ninth Circuit relied on the principle that predominance
in employment cases is typically unaffected by differences among class employees,
“so long as liability arises from a common practice or policy of an employer.” Id.
(indicating narrow circumstances when predominance is defeated).
165. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 947 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 352 (2011)) (rejecting Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ survey could not
meet Rule 23 certification if “ ‘no reasonable juror’ could find it probative of
whether an element of liability was met” (quoting Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049)).  De-
fendants also claimed Plaintiffs’ use of representative evidence did not satisfy pre-
dominance requirements for classification of the 23(b)(3) classes. See id. at 927
(referring to Plaintiffs’ submission of Main survey).
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Sullivan’s governmental interest test and ultimately found Califor-
nia law applied to the 23(b)(3) California Class.166  On appeal, De-
fendants argued this was improper due to the vast differences
between their case and the Sullivan case.167  However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Defendants argument, holding “a close reading of
Sullivan indicates that California law should apply to the California
class, even though many of the employers are not headquartered in
California.”168
Defendants further contended Plaintiffs’ representative evi-
dence, the Main Survey, failed to demonstrate predominance for
any of the 23(b)(3) classes because the survey did not include infor-
mation about the activities performed while working, and because
the survey demonstrated significant variations in players’ arrival and
departure times.169  The Ninth Circuit rejected Defendants’ argu-
ment as an “erroneous view of the record and . . . cramped reading
of Tyson.”170  The court separated the 23(b)(3) classes for this part
of its analysis with regards to the representative evidence.171
The Ninth Circuit pointed to the time the Arizona and Florida
classes spent during spring training, extended spring training, and
the instructional leagues.172  Relying on Tyson, the Ninth Circuit
concluded Plaintiffs could demonstrate liability for these two classes
by showing the class members “performed any compensable
work.”173  However, the California class required additional analysis
on this issue because Plaintiffs’ claims for this class involved work
performed during a time when players did get paid.174  To survive,
the California class had to show its members worked more than “8
hours in a day, more than 40 hours in a week, and/or worked 7
166. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 929-30 (detailing district court’s analysis).
167. See id. at 930 (explaining Defendants’ objection to reliance on Sullivan).
168. Id. (explaining “Sullivan merely emphasized that employees of in-state
employers would especially be covered by California law”).
169. See id. at 942 (outlining Defendants’ arguments).
170. Id. (clarifying “representative evidence offered by plaintiffs was not lim-
ited to just the Main Survey, nor are observational studies the only type of evidence
permitted to fill in evidentiary gaps under Tyson”).
171. See id. at 944 (referring to complexities involved in California class certi-
fication compared to Arizona and Florida classes).
172. See id. at 942 (relating to unpaid work times).
173. Id. (detailing how Plaintiffs may establish liability).  Predominance issues
may be resolved “by answering two questions: (1) are the players employees of
defendants, and (2) do the minor league team activities during these periods con-
stitute compensable work under the laws of either Arizona or Florida?” Id. (hold-
ing these two questions hold greater importance than individual issues).
174. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 944 (referring to MiLB’s championship season last-
ing from April to September).
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days in a workweek.”175  Similarly, California class members must
demonstrate they were not paid minimum wage to establish liability
on minimum wage claims.176  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit left the
district court’s certification of the California class in part due to
California’s expansive definition of “employ” and “hours
worked.”177
In a final challenge of Plaintiffs’ representative evidence, De-
fendants relied on Wal-Mart.178  Defendants argued that Wal-Mart
required the district court to “rigorously analyze” the Main Survey,
“rather than evaluating its admissibility under Daubert and its ap-
propriateness for meeting class certification requirements under
Tyson.”179  However, the Ninth Circuit explained this argument
fails under Tyson, which “explicitly distinguished the use of repre-
sentative evidence to establish hours worked in wage and hour
claims from the use of representative evidence in cases like Wal-
Mart.”180
C. FLSA Collective
Finally, the Court addressed whether the district court prop-
erly certified Plaintiffs’ federal FLSA collective.181  Defendants ar-
gued Plaintiffs’ representative evidence failed to demonstrate that
FLSA collective members were similarly situated.182  However, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the FLSA collective’s certification because
175. Id. (citing Cal. Labor Code § 510; Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc., 393 P.3d
375, 381-82 (2017)) (explaining what California class must show to prove liability
on overtime claims).
176. See id. (outlining requirements to prove liability given variations of
claims).
177. See id. (affirming certification of California class).
178. See id. at 947 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352
(2011)) (arguing admissibility evaluation under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).  Defendants in Senne asserted the district court failed to
“rigorously analyze” the Main Survey. See id. at 927, 947 (requesting reversal of
district court).
179. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 947 (making final attempt to exclude Plaintiffs’
Main Survey).
180. Id. (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048
(2016)) (holding Tyson requires court to reject Defendants’ suggested analysis).
The Ninth Circuit found Defendants’ reliance on Wal-Mart to be “misplaced” due
to the factual similarities between Senne and Tyson, both wage and hour cases in-
volving an employer’s failure to keep proper records. Id. (meaning in circum-
stances such as in Senne, courts must evaluate the admissibility of representative
evidence under Daubert and the appropriateness for meeting class certification
under Tyson).
181. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 947 (discussing FLSA parameters).
182. See id. at 927 (referring to Main Survey).
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Plaintiffs’ FLSA collective actions covered players’ unpaid work.183
Citing Mt. Clemens, the Ninth Circuit Court was satisfied with certifi-
cation of the collective because it fell within the court’s interpreta-
tion of “similarly situated,” and was consistent with FLSA’s “great
public policy.”184
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT HIT A HOMERUN
With the Senne decision, the Ninth Circuit significantly “en-
larged the scope” of class actions for wage-and-hour claims.185  The
court’s choice-of-law and predominance analysis played out as ex-
pected, but allowing current and former minor league players to
pursue wage-and-hour claims against the almighty MLB was unprec-
edented.186  In past decisions, courts gave great deference to the
MLB, specifically by permitting them to exploit players due to ex-
emptions from antitrust laws.187
In Senne, the court gave Plaintiffs the green light to continue
their class action under violations of the laws in three states.188  Sig-
nificantly, the three states where these violations took place are the
home of several minor league teams and all thirty MLB teams’
183. See id. at 949 (including work performed during spring training, ex-
tended spring training, and instructional leagues).
184. Id. at 950 (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946))
(alluding to broad application of FLSA).
185. See Zagger, supra note 40 (quoting Indiana Professor, Nathaniel Grow) R
(referring to Ninth Circuit’s allowance of classifying Plaintiffs’ claims from differ-
ent states); see also Spedden, supra note 42 (referring to Arizona and Florida play- R
ers included in class action).
186. See also Zagger, supra note 40 (“Usually, you don’t see these as a tradi- R
tional class action, you only see the collective action under the FLSA.” (quoting
labor and employment attorney Michael Elkins of MLE Law)).  For further discus-
sion of past legal challenges brought by players against the MLB, see supra notes
120-129 and accompanying text.  This ruling serves as a glimmer of hope for the R
minor league plaintiffs which was handed down almost “[a] year after Congress
blocked minor league baseball players from seeking federal labor protections.” See
id. (referring to SAPA); see also Mike DeBonis, Spending Bill Could Quash Minor
League Baseball Players’ Wage Claims, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/spending-bill-could-quash-minor-league-
baseball-players-wage-claims/2018/03/18/d31cd76e-2b0a-11e8-8ad6-
fbc50284fce8_story.html [https://perma.cc/5ZCP-CU56] (detailing spending bill
signed by President Trump).
187. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding baseball’s anti-
trust exemption); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (uphold-
ing baseball’s antitrust exemption); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l
League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (dismissing claims against
MLB for violations under Sherman Antitrust Act).
188. See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 950 (9th Cir.
2019) (“We are satisfied that certification of the collective is not only appropriate
under our interpretation of ‘similarly situated,’ but also that it is consistent with
‘the great public policy’ embodied by the FLSA.”).
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spring training facilities.189  Indeed, Senne is still in the early stages
of litigation and Plaintiffs still have many innings to work  through
before succeeding with their claim.190  However, the Ninth Circuit’s
rejection of Defendants’ argument that variations in state laws and
individual players’ schedules barred the case from going forward,
“reopened the door” for the athletes in their quest for better pay.191
In a final swing to shut down Senne, the MLB petitioned the
Supreme Court for help, arguing the Ninth Circuit’s decision cre-
ated a circuit split and deviated from Supreme Court precedent.192
The two substantial questions the MLB bunted to the Supreme
Court involved issues which could dramatically impact labor law.193
First, the MLB asserted the Ninth Circuit erred in allowing class
189. See Zagger, supra note 40 (noting success on state claims could mean R
MLB “will have to pay a significant number of minor league players minimum
wage and overtime for both the season and spring training regardless of the
change to federal law”).
190. See id. (referring to recent passing of SAPA which exempted minor
league players from FLSA).  “Unless MLB’s antitrust exemption is rescinded or
narrowed, claims under federal antitrust law would not be available to minor
league owners.  But there are other areas of law that they could invoke.” See
Michael McCann, MLB Faces Tough Legal Road to Restructure Minor League Baseball,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.si.com/mlb/2019/11/19/mi-
nor-league-baseball-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/G2RR-6KR7] (implying minor
leaguers have alternate legal avenues for wage suit).
191. See Boysen, supra note 161 (explaining “mishmash” of states’ laws creates R
legal morass; defeating certification in and of itself).  U.S. Circuit Judge Sandra
Segal Ikuta disagreed with the majority decision, “criticizing the majority for being
too quick to cut through the Gordian knot with ‘a simple rule’ of its own device,
namely ‘just apply the law of the jurisdiction where the work took place.’” Id.
(arguing choice-of-law issues defeated certification).
192. See Defendants-Appellees’ Motion to Stay the Mandate at 6, Senne v.
Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019) (17-16245) [hereinaf-
ter Motion to Stay the Mandate] (arguing three substantial questions implicating
Circuit conflicts require review).  The MLB remains confident in its defense that
the Ninth Circuit’s decision improperly strayed from precedent. See Boysen, supra
note 161 (“MLB said each of those decisions conflicts with either Supreme Court R
precedent or decisions by other appeals courts.”).  Defendants’ petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court involves the following two issues: “(1) Whether
Tyson sanctions the use of statistical surveys to establish commonality and predomi-
nance for a wage-and-hour class that encompasses different kinds of employees
performing different kinds of work for different employers at different worksites
under different compensation terms; (2) Whether cohesiveness is required for
class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 2,
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 19-1339 (June 1, 2020) (presenting
questions for consideration).
193. See Motion to Stay the Mandate, supra note 192, at 7 (claiming significant R
chance Supreme Court will grant review).  The MLB claims delaying the case for
their petition for certiorari would not adversely affect anyone involved, but minor
league players are left struggling to make ends meet until an indeterminate Su-
preme Court decision. See Boysen, supra note 161 (“Because this case presents R
three substantial questions implicating circuit conflicts, there is a significant
chance that the Supreme Court will grant review.” (quoting the MLB)).
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certification because it flatly ignored the Supreme Courts’ prior
raising of the bar for bringing wage and hour claims in a class ac-
tion.194  Second, the MLB contended the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Senne directly conflicts with a Third Circuit decision regarding the
use of representative evidence to certify wage-and-hour classes.195
The MLB argued that in Senne and Ferreras v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,196
both circuit courts were “invited to read Tyson as creating a wage-
and-hour exception to Wal-Mart; the Ninth Circuit accepted that
invitation, while the Third Circuit declined it.”197  The MLB further
argued that if the Ninth Circuit properly followed the Supreme
Court’s precedent in Wal-Mart, it would have conducted a rigorous
analysis and concluded that Plaintiffs “could not proceed as a class
because they ‘would need individualized, not representative, evi-
dence to prove their case.’”198  The MLB’s petition to the Supreme
Court was shortlived, as the Court subsequently denied certiorari,
allowing the case to proceed in trial court.199  The Supreme Court’s
194. See Boysen, supra note 161 (referencing Supreme Court’s 2011 decision R
in Wal-Mart).  The MLB argued both the district court and the Ninth Circuit failed
to adhere to Wal-Mart’s heightened standard for “evidence proffered to satisfy Rule
23 must always be rigorously examined.” See generally Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338 (2011) (conflicting with appellate precedent).
195. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 192, at 26 (citing Ferreras v. R
Am. Airlines, Inc., 946 F.3d 178, 181-86 (3d Cir. 2019)) (arguing Ninth Circuit
improperly created wage-and-hour exception to Wal-Mart).
196. 946 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2019).
197. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 192, at 26 (arguing stark R
conflict between Senne and Ferreras decisions).  In both cases, Defendants argue,
classes “sought to prove entitlement to backpay via a sample of clock-in and clock-
out times,” class members were not consistently working while clocked-in, and
“there was substantial variability in what they were doing, even if some of it could
be called work.” Id. at 27-28. (explaining despite factual similarities between Senne
and Ferreras, Ninth Circuit came to different conclusion).  “Yet the Ninth Circuit
nonetheless found no Rule 23 or Rules Enabling Act problem with allowing these
thousands of disparately situated individuals to band together and proceed as a
class on the basis of such borderline-irrelevant representative evidence.” Id. at 28
(alleging improper application of Wal-Mart).
198. Id. at 28 (implying individualized evidence poses issues with Rule 23 cer-
tification); see also Ferreras, 946 F.3d at 185-87 (holding evidence of arrival and de-
parture times cannot establish commonality and predominance).  The Ninth
Circuit rejected this analysis claiming such application would mean “employees
working side-by-side in the same position would not only be owed vastly different
minimum wages, but also that an employer would need to set different rules for
meal and rest breaks for different employees. . . .” See Zagger, supra note 40 (re- R
jecting Ferreras analysis).
199. See Chris Bumbaca, Minor leaguers score win in quest for fair wages as Supreme
Court dismisses MLB request, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/mlb/minors/2020/10/05/supreme-court-mlb-minor-league-salary-
wages/3625838001/ [https://perma.cc/9MDF-8VA7] (“The Supreme Court’s de-
cision to let the class certification decision stand is great news for minor league
players.”) (quoting Korein Tillery LLC, law firm representing plaintiffs).
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\28-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 31 27-JAN-21 15:24
2021] SHUT UP AND PITCH 83
denial serves as a valuable development in the case for the players,
permitting the Ninth Circuit’s class certification decision stand and
thereby giving the case the green light to commence litigation.200
While the Justices offered no written opinion explaining its deci-
sion to deny the MLB’s petition, it is conceivable that the Ninth
Circuit’s prominent jurisprudence shaped the Court’s decision, as
the Ninth Circuit is one of the largest federal appellate courts in
the federal circuit and along with the Third and Second circuits,
“cumulatively have accounted for 69% of the antitrust class action
filings in the United States” for the past decade.201
VI. IMPACT: MINOR LEAGUERS ARE IN NEED OF A CLOSER
“During the offseason, these players are relegated to working as much as they
can, just so they can afford to make it through the next season without going
broke. . . . [B]aseball has the best developmental system of all professional
sports. And in response to trying to get its members MINIMUM WAGE, the
response was to attempt to gut the system.”202
Now that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Senne withstood the
MLB’s appeal to the Supreme Court, its impact will reach far be-
yond the MiLB.203  The circuit court’s decision will not only signifi-
cantly effect minor league players, but also developmental
programs for other professional sports.204  In anticipation of the
200. See Jenna West, Supreme Court Allows Minor Leaguers’ Class-Action Lawsuit
Over Pay, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/10/
05/supreme-court-allows-minor-league-players-class-action-lawsuit-pay [https://
perma.cc/S2AU-UAUQ] (“After almost four years on appeal, the players can now
return to the trial court to ensure that Major League Baseball and team owners
comply with minimum and overtime wage laws, a welcome development for minor
leaguers in a very unusual year.”) (quoting Korein Tillery LLC, law firm represent-
ing plaintiffs).
201. Brian Ellman & Almudena Arcelus, The Evolving Standards for Class Certifi-
cation in Antitrust Cases, ANALYSIS GROUP, https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalas-
sets/content/insights/publishing/the_evolving_standards_class_certification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM6H-4AGT] (last visited Nov. 17, 2020) (detailing Ninth Cir-
cuit’s precedent with class actions).
202. See Adam Mann, MLB Announces MiLB Pay Increase, FANSIDED (Feb. 16,
2020), https://calltothepen.com/2020/02/16/mlb-announces-milb-2020-pay-in-
crease-4-76-hr/ [https://perma.cc/X25F-5LSP] (detailing poor minor league
working conditions).
203. See Grow, supra note 34, at 1023-24 (concluding Senne presents “signifi- R
cant threat” to MLB and MiLB).
204. See Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 26 (speculating ramifications on entire sports R
industry if Senne plaintiffs succeed).  If the Supreme Court were to affirm the
Ninth Circuit’s holding, and down the road, Plaintiffs were then successful in liti-
gating their case, the ramifications of requiring full and fair compensation to mi-
nor league players will drastically alter the MiLB system. See Yagman, supra note 35 R
(predicting MiLB system could potentially resemble NBA’s development league).
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upcoming negotiations with the MiLB, the MLB announced plans
to completely overhaul the minor league system.205  This proposed
overhaul and potential loss of jobs rubbed salt in the wounds of
many minor league players, staff, and coaches.206  Skeptics believe
the MLB’s intentions are more financially motivated.207  Another
residual consequence of the MLB’s proposal is the effect on “local
communities who stand to lose their teams—and accompanying
jobs, business and investment” which has inspired these effected
groups to “unify efforts to persuade or, if necessary, try to stop
MLB.”208
The MLB remains steadfast in the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s
unfavorable ruling, finding themselves only in the “first inning of
negotiations” with the expiring PBA.209  As a result of the public
Minimum wages for MiLB players could also entice collegiate baseball players to
leave the college level, causing an unexpected shift in amateur baseball. See id.
(implying impacts trickling down to collegiate baseball).  While the MLB will face
obstacles in operating budgets and accounting protocols, if Plaintiffs are successful
in Senne, other industries, beyond professional baseball, may be impacted as well.
See Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 26, 58 (concluding plaintiffs in Senne may have found R
way to “force change outside of the traditional legal theories used by the players in
the history of professional sports”).
205. See Ben Weinrib, MLB Has a Radical Proposal that Would Eliminate 40 Minor
League Teams, YAHOO SPORTS (Oct. 18, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/mlb-radi-
cal-proposal-eliminate-40-minor-league-teams-211937863.html [https://perma.cc/
4EJM-MLKN] (referencing MLB’s proposal to cut forty-two MiLB teams).  While
the MLB claims their proposal’s goal is “improving facility quality and player pay, it
appears likely to hurt MLB teams’ ability to develop talent, cost thousands of play-
ers’ jobs and leave dozens of cities without teams that their fans have grown up
loving and investing in.” Id. (detailing adverse effects from cutting local minor
league teams).
206. See Robert M. Pimpsner, Manfred’s MiLB Plan is Bad for Baseball, PIN-
STRIPED PROSPECTS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.pinstripedprospects.com/opinion-
manfreds-milb-plan-is-bad-for-baseball-updated-49773/ [https://perma.cc/QF4H-
Z78H] (detailing adverse effects of MLB’s proposal).
207. See Mitch Rupert, Owner: Crosscutters “Aren’t Going Anywhere,” SUN GA-
ZETTE (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.sungazette.com/news/top-news/2020/01/
owner-crosscutters-arent-going-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/FT8M-ZXHC] (re-
porting MLB’s contention for MiLB overhaul order to fit with demands of player
development).  “Take Williamsport as an example: Major League Baseball takes
care of our field. We probably have the best field in all of Minor League Baseball,
and I say that as someone who owns a Triple-A team (the Memphis Redbirds).” Id.
(quoting Peter Freund) (suggesting MLB’s motivation is cost cutting, rather than
facility improvements).  “It’s just the excuse Major League Baseball hides behind
to say this is why we’re doing it.” Id. (quoting Peter Freund) (arguing MLB wants
to cut teams to have fewer players to pay).
208. Michael McCann, Save the Spinners: How One Town Attempts to Stave Off
MLB’s Contractual Plan for the Minors, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 7, 2020), https://
www.si.com/mlb/2020/01/08/save-the-lowell-spinners-controversial-plan-for-milb
[https://perma.cc/A57B-P9YX] (detailing negative effects cutting MiLB teams will
have on local communities).
209. See Rupert, supra note 207 (quoting Peter Freund) (detailing tension sur- R
rounding upcoming negotiations between MiLB and MLB).
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backlash, MLB announced it plans to raise the minimum salary for
minor leaguers in 2021.210  This comes as another victory for minor
league players whose salaries have “largely been stagnant since
2005, and . . . have strained to make ends meet on as little as $5,500
per season.”211  While Commissioner Rob Manfred cites the MLB’s
priority of player wellness, many criticize that a salary increase is
well overdue.212
A. Governmental Response
While Plaintiffs in Senne have a long road before achieving re-
prieve, a significant relief pitcher, the U.S. Government Accounta-
bility Office (“GAO”), is taking the mound in support of the minor
leaguers cause.213  In early 2020, the House Oversight and Reform
Committee approved legislation “to have the comptroller general
of the U.S. study baseball’s minor leagues, which are trying to fend
off a contraction proposal from major league clubs.”214  Depending
on the study’s findings, a GAO report would  likely “become an in-
fluential document in negotiations between MLB and MiLB on a
new professional agreement.”215  While some pessimists criticize
this congressional act as an excuse for baseball fanatics in govern-
210. See Associated Press, MLB Raising Minimum Salary for Minor Leaguers in
2021, ESPN (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/28702734/
mlb-raising-minimum-salary-minor-leaguers-2021 [https://perma.cc/TQS5-DBBK]
(“Two years after successfully lobbying Congress to exempt minor leaguers from
federal minimum wage laws, MLB opted to give those players a wage increase be-
tween 38% and 72%.”).
211. Id. (“MLB teams are fully responsible for minor league player salaries
under the current PBA.”).
212. See Mann, supra note 202 (“Asking the multibillion-dollar industry to fork R
out minimum wage salaries for its developmental players shouldn’t be a tough
ask.”).
213. See Associated Press, House Committee Approves Study of Minor Leagues by
Comptroller General, ESPN (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/
28838292/house-committee-approves-study-minor-leagues-comptroller-general
[https://perma.cc/P7ZR-LLPC] (referring to House Oversight and Reform
Committee).
214. House Asks Comptroller General to Study Minor Leagues, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/5ee506f21a100658b94aca04b70d02ca
[https://perma.cc/RDK3-9F8Y] (reporting House of Representatives pass legisla-
tion for study of the MiLB).  The study would involve an evaluation of the “social,
economic and historic contributions that the MiLB has made to American life and
culture.”  H.R. 6020, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020) (finding “preservation of Minor
League Baseball in 160 communities is in the public interest, as it will continue to
provide affordable, family friendly entertainment to those communities”).
215. Michael McCann, What’s Next in Fight to Protect Minor League Baseball?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/03/04/mlb-
milb-agreement-congress-review-hr-6020 [https://perma.cc/9CQH-FSFS] (“A
GAO report on the minors would likely bring about Congressional hearings on the
relationship between MLB and MiLB.”).
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ment to have an excuse to talk about baseball, a GAO report could
be substantially beneficial to the minor leaguers as it “would be au-
thoritative, objective and credible.”216  With opposition from the
general public and a growing governmental coalition to take on the
MLB, the league should settle Senne because it could repair its bro-
ken relationship with the public and ward off growing governmen-
tal pressure.217
B. Minor Leagues, Small Towns
“This is the connection that keeps us young and allows our rebirth every
spring, as once again we hear the sounds of the smack of the ball in the glove
and the crack of the bat as it makes contact with a pitched ball.”218
“[M]inor league teams positively impact their fan bases and lo-
cal economies . . . for families who live far from big-league teams or
who can’t afford major league ticket prices.”219  “The abandonment
of Minor League Clubs would devastate our communities, their
bond purchasers, and other stakeholders affected by the potential
loss of these clubs.”220  With America more divided than ever, the
MiLB serves as neutral playing field that “connects many of us to
our communities and our neighbors.”221
216. Id. (reporting GAO report could “make it more difficult for MLB to jus-
tify sweeping changes”). But see Craig Calcaterra, Congressional Task Force Passes Res-
olution Opposing MLB’s Minor League Contraction Plan, NBC SPORTS (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2020/01/28/congressional-task-force-passes-resolu-
tion-opposing-mlbs-minor-league-contraction-plan/ [https://perma.cc/F9H2-
WPA4] (“It’s worth noting, again, that this move by Congress does nothing sub-
stantively and, rather, exists primarily to allow Members of Congress to talk about
baseball, hot dogs, apple pie and America in that way that politicians like to do.”).
217. See Alex Gangitano, MLB, Congress Play Hardball in Fight Over Minor
Leagues, THE HILL (Feb. 6, 2020), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/busi-
ness-a-lobbying/481755-mlb-congress-play-hardball-in-fight-over-minor-leagues
[https://perma.cc/5ELD-CPWN] (“But MLB is facing opposition from the gen-
eral public and a broad coalition of lawmakers from both parties who say closing
those teams would devastate communities in their districts.”).  For further discus-
sion on the potential impact of cutting over forty MiLB teams, see infra notes
210–226 and accompanying text. R
218. FRAN ZIMNIUCH, SHORTENED SEASONS: THE UNTIMELY DEATHS OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL’S STARS AND JOURNEYMEN 2 (Taylor Trade Publ’g 2007).
219. McCann, supra note 190 (supporting congressional opposition to MLB’s R
proposal to eliminate minor league teams).
220. Id. (quoting U.S. Congresswoman Lori Trahan of Massachusetts and U.S.
Congressman David McKinley of West Virginia letter in opposition to MLB’s pro-
posal to cut several minor league teams).
221. Steve Benjamin, Andy Berke & Nan Whaley, Why Gutting Minor League
Baseball Would Be Disastrous for Our Cities, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2020), https://for-
tune.com/2020/02/03/mlb-minor-league-baseball-eliminate-teams/ [https://
perma.cc/QJ9U-PW4M] (quoting Steve Benjamin, mayor of Columbia, S.C., Andy
Berke, mayor of Chattanooga, Tenn., and Nan Whaley, mayor of Dayton, Ohio).
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While MLB owners claim their intention of slashing more than
forty teams is rooted in cutting costs to improve minor league con-
ditions, popularity of  lower tiered teams has remained consistently
high for over a decade.222  Local taxpayers have an incredible stake
in the continued operation of local minor league teams, which is
why the MLB’s treatment of such players and their proposed re-
structuring is broader than just a player issue.223  Support from
Congress is substantial for local leaders because it provides consid-
erable leverage in taking on the MLB.224  Objectors of the MLB’s
proposal argue the MLB “became the giant it is today with the co-
222. See id. (“Last year, attendance at America’s minor league ballparks ex-
ceeded 40 million—the 15th year in a row that such clubs have exceeded that
benchmark.”).
223. See id. (“To keep baseball in these communities, cities have invested valu-
able public resources in new ballparks.”).  The codependency between MiLB
teams and the communities where they are based is a quality distinguishing the
MiLB from the MLB. See James Wagner, Minor League Baseball’s Opposition to Over-
haul Softens in Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/12/sports/baseball/minor-leagues-mlb-takeover.html [https://
perma.cc/HE3W-A9AR] (“Minor league teams rely heavily on revenue derived
from people in the stands — tickets, beer and hot dog sales and sponsorships tied
to attendance. But for the foreseeable future, there will not be fans at games be-
cause of the coronavirus pandemic. Even in normal times, more than a handful of
canceled games, typically rainouts, could mean the difference between being prof-
itable or not.”).  The Dayton Dragons, a Class A MiLB team, for example, draws
540,000 fans to Dayton, Ohio each summer.  See Stephen Starr, Can Small-Town
America Survive Pandemic’s Hit to Minor League Baseball?, OZY (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.ozy.com/news-and-politics/will-small-town-america-survive-the-
pandemics-hit-to-minor-league-baseball/377099/ [https://perma.cc/4LL8-UMXJ]
(reporting “baseball fans contribute $27.5 million each year to the local economy”
in Dayton).  Many communities, like Dayton, “have paid to have the ballparks built
in the downtown core,” with the expectation that MiLB fans attending games will
spend money at the businesses surrounding those MiLB parks. Id. (noting many
MiLB teams use significant portions of their income to pay rent back to owners of
the facilities in small towns).  Local towns with MiLB teams invest their entire econ-
omies around baseball, which is why cutting even just a single team would have
calamitous effects for the fans and workers living within a community. See Patrick
Sisson, Small Towns Across America May Loose a Crucial Community Hub, CURBED (Dec.
27, 2019), https://www.curbed.com/2019/12/27/21038071/minor-league-base-
ball-stadium-team-economic-development [https://perma.cc/3L9P-AFZH] (“Cut-
ting back on Minor League baseball strikes at romantic notions of the sport as a
national pastime.”).  Despite MiLB teams suffering due to a cancelled 2020 season,
many teams turned its focus to the communities where they are based, to serve as
an outlet for support beyond the field. See Angelia L. Davia, Greenville Area Events
Keep Community Engaged During the Pandemic, GREENVILLE NEWS (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/local/2020/09/09/greenville-non-
profits-getting-help-from-local-businesses-groups/5747138002/ [https://
perma.cc/3HZJ-NSME] (reporting MiLB team Greenville Drive hosts virtual 5K
run benefitting local food bank).
224. See Seiner, supra note 138 (noting Congress’ control over MLB’s anti- R
trust exemption).  The MLB “should understand that the antitrust exemption for
Major League Baseball is at risk if they persist with this misguided, deeply unfortu-
nate plan to cripple minor league baseball for more profits.”  Anthony, supra note
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operation of an entire country.”225  Minor leaguers must unite and
take on the MLB as one unit to overcome the MLB’s chokehold on
their careers.226
VII. CONCLUSION: A GLOBAL PANDEMIC AND ECONOMIC DESPAIR
MIGHT JUST BE THE PERFECT STORM TO STRIKE OUT THE
MLB
March 13, 2020 will forever be an infamous day in American
history.227  On this day, the World Health Organization (WHO)
confirmed the 1,000th  case of COVID-19 in the United States, and
with that, the MLB suspended spring training camps indefinitely.228
At a time when the American public so badly needed a distraction
140 (quoting Senator Richard Blumenthal) (implying severe consequences for R
MLB if it fails to act).
225. Anthony, supra note 140 (suggesting MLB has forgotten about this sup- R
port); see also Sisson, supra note 223 (“In addition to nostalgic ideas of baseball R
bringing communities together, it’s considered an economic development engine
for small towns; when minor league teams lose major league support or shutter
altogether, it can have a negative economic impact, including the loss of hundreds
or even thousands of jobs nationwide and the closure of stadiums that might
anchor downtowns.”).  “For nearly 100 years now, MLB has operated without being
subject to antitrust laws, streamlining business deals that become less complicated
and more lucrative.”  Anthony, supra note 140 (suggesting MLB’s success largely R
attributed to facilitation from local markets and federal government).  “In a capi-
talist economic society it is almost impossible for employees to safeguard their eco-
nomic position on their own.”  Williams, supra note 116, at 542 (concluding “[t]o R
level the playing field and counter Major League Baseball’s leverage” MiLB players
must unionize).  Many small towns across the nation are pleading with the MLB to
“[s]top trying to squeeze every penny out of a situation that would choke the base-
ball life out of places like Dodd Stadium and beyond.” Id. (advocating MLB’s obli-
gation to espouse “respect for community”).  To these affected communities, the
MLB’s proposal is motivated by financial greed, at all costs, even if it involves put-
ting the MiLB “on the chopping block . . . without care to the communities, or
families or charities that will suffer as a result.” Id. (quoting Senator Richard Blu-
menthal) (“That’s what really is at stake here, support for communities that have
supported these teams over many, many years, and now very simply are asking
these teams to respect them.”).
226. See Williams, supra note 116, at 543 (comparing MiLB players’ vulnerabil- R
ity to average employees in America).  While the MLB has effectively stripped mi-
nor leaguers from challenging their low wages under the FLSA, minor leaguers
still have “legal eligibility to form a union.” Id. (arguing under NLRA minor
league players have right to engage in collective action for mutual gain); see also
Carney, supra note 30, at 307 (suggesting MLB permit MiLB players to form R
union).
227. See Perry, supra note 13 (detailing COVID-19’s impact on MLB). R
228. See id. (reporting MLB players given option to return home, remain near
Arizona or Florida camp, or return to team’s home city); see also Press Release,
Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball to Delay 2020 Opening Day by at
Least Two Weeks (Mar. 12, 2020) (on file with author) (“This action is being taken
in the interests of the safety and well-being of our players, Clubs and our millions
of loyal fans.”).
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from the horrors of a pandemic, all eyes were on major sports
leagues to see how they would address safely returning to their sea-
sons during a global crisis.229
With the already strained tensions between the MLB and MiLB
leading up to this point, the COVID-19 pandemic hit especially
hard on minor league players, who subsequently had their 2020 sea-
son cancelled.230  While the MLB’s season finally began in late July,
the decision to cancel the 2020 minor league season was a “more
daunting undertaking for MiLB than for MLB.  Unlike MLB
franchises, minor league teams rely heavily on revenue from people
in the stands — tickets, beer and hot dog sales and sponsorships
tied to attendance.”231  The devastation from the pandemic has left
the MiLB crushed; however, these circumstances could possibly be
a source of bargaining power with the big leagues.232  Now that the
229. See Joe Drape, Ken Belson & Billy Witz, The Coronavirus Doesn’t Care When
Sports Come Back, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/
19/sports/coronavirus-sports-economy.html [https://perma.cc/GD7C-AEVM]
(“Fans are clamoring for something, anything, to distract from the pandemic and
restore sports to the rhythm of American life . . . .”).
230. See James Wagner, Minor League Baseball Season Is Canceled for the First
Time, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/sports/
baseball/minor-league-baseball-seasoncanceled.html#:~:text=the%20announce-
ment%20that%20160%20minor,baseball%20season%20will%20not%20happen
[https://perma.cc/ET9L-B3FD] (leaving nearly 8,000 minor league players unem-
ployed until 2021).  Before the 2020 minor league season was cancelled, the MLB
announced players “under a Minor League Uniform Player Contract will receive a
lump sum equal to the allowances that would have been paid through April 8th.”
R.J. Anderson, MLB Announces Support for Minor-League Players During Coronavirus
Shutdown, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/
mlb-announces-support-for-minor-league-players-during-coronavirus-shutdown/
[https://perma.cc/QY5Z-4H5F] (reporting MLB’s assistance of minor league play-
ers beyond April 8, 2020 remains uncertain).
231. See Wagner, supra note 230 (“Technically, the season’s fate was sealed R
when Major League Baseball informed MiLB that it would not be providing the
players needed for the season because of the national emergency brought on by
the coronavirus pandemic.”); see also How MLB is Navigating the Coronavirus Pan-
demic to Play Ball, ESPN (May 19, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/
29175321/how-major-league-baseball-finding-narrow-way-back-field-coronavirus-
pandemic [https://perma.cc/U3A6-GNDA] (detailing various aspects required to
commence baseball including cooperation of twenty-seven U.S. cities and more
than 200,000 coronavirus tests); 2020 MLB Season at a Glance: Opening Day Schedule,
Previews, Picks and More, ESPN (July 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/
_/id/29435596/2020-mlb-season-glance-opening-day-schedule-previews-picks-
more [https://perma.cc/8RLK-UAT6] (reporting training camp to occur prior to
Opening Day).
232. See Jared Diamond, Shortened MLB Draft Sends Baseball Prospects Into Uncer-
tain Future, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-
ened-mlb-draft-sends-baseball-prospects-into-uncertain-future-11586952000
[https://perma.cc/ZSX3-TVN3] (detailing how baseball owners are trying to cut
costs).  Prior to the pandemic, MiLB players were not eligible for unemployment
benefits due to their status as “seasonal apprentices.” See Steve Gardner, Minor
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Supreme Court has denied the MLB’s petition, the path to more
equitable wages appears to be on the horizon.233  Plaintiffs will
enter this next phase of litigation with an upper hand over the
MLB: the Ninth Circuit’s favorable ruling and the Supreme Court’s
declination of its appeal.234
A cancelled 2020 minor league season, a shortened 2020 draft
from the typical forty rounds to as few as five rounds, and the loom-
ing restructuring plan of the MiLB altogether pose a substantial
threat to amateur baseball.235  The coronavirus’ “financial hit could
lead to a moderate shakeup in ownership — team owners who lack
League Baseball Players Look for Financial Life Line as MLB Teams Halt Payments, USA
TODAY (May 27, 2020) (referencing provisions under Save America’s Pastime Act
classifying minor leaguers as not employees of their parent clubs).  However, the
federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) has pro-
vided relief to these minor league players as well as other Americans typically ex-
empt from receiving unemployment benefits. See Aaron Colby & Arthur Simpson,
CARES Act Extends Unemployment Insurance Benefits to Independent Contractors, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/employment-
labor-and-benefits/2020/04/independent-contractor-unemployment-benefits
[https://perma.cc/ZW5A-YDPD] (explaining U.S. Department of Labor’s estab-
lishment of Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Opinion Letter on Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program No. 16-20 (Apr. 27, 2020) (providing guidance on Pan-
demic Unemployment Assistance program).
233. See Daniel Wiessner, SCOTUS won’t take a swing at MLB minor leaguers’
wage claims, REUTERS LEGAL (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/em-
ployment-scotus/scotus-wont-take-a-swing-at-mlb-minor-leaguers-wage-claims-id
USL1N2GW1TX [https://perma.cc/JLT5-5XK5] (detailing significance of Su-
preme Court’s denial of MLB’s petition).
234. See Henry Schulman, Ex-Giants prospect wins Supreme Court go-ahead for mi-






(“The Supreme Court refused to hear the case on the first day of its 2020-21 term.
That sends it back to a judge in San Francisco, who will set a trial date. The defend-
ants could file motions on other grounds, but their request for a Supreme Court
writ was viewed as the last significant impediment to a trial.”).
235. See Jeff Passan & Kiley McDaniel, What the MLB Deal with Players Means for
2020 Season and Beyond, ESPN (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/
_/id/28964249/what-mlb-deal-players-means-2020-season-beyond [https://
perma.cc/VWM6-N76Y] (referring to changes regarding undrafted free agents).
While some clubs continue to pay weekly payments of $400 to minor league play-
ers, many players have turned to unemployment benefits as a temporary source of
income. See Emma Baccellieri, Minor Leaguers and the Fight to Claim Unemployment,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jun. 12, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/06/12/mi-
nor-league-baseball-players-unemployment [https://perma.cc/CVJ9-CQXX] (re-
porting fraught process of requesting unemployment benefits for MiLB players);
see also Gardner, supra note 232 (reporting uncertain climate likely will drive many R
players out of baseball).
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financial fluidity, either in their sports ownership or other business
ventures, may be hard-pressed not to sell and reap the immediate
financial boost.”236  Given the overall purpose of class actions and
the strong policy concerns in favor of certifying multi-state claims in
wage-and-hour cases, the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding for
Plaintiffs.237  While minor league players have to play several more
innings before they can actually hold the MLB accountable, the
current state of the country might be just what the players need to
finally play ball.238
Bernadette Berger*
236. Adam Kilgore, Amateurs with More Negotiating Power and Owners Who Might
Sell, WASH. POST (July 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/
07/30/how-will-coronavirus-change-sports/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/
8GE7-7ZFE] (reporting challenges faced by COVID-19).
237. See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir.
2019) (explaining policy concerns of choice-of-law issues regarding labor dis-
putes). “To permit nonresidents to work in California without the protection of
our overtime law would completely sacrifice, as to those employees, the state’s im-
portant public policy goals of protecting health and safety and preventing the evils
associated with overwork.” Id. (citing Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 247
(Cal. 2011)).
238. See Sean Roberts, Can Minor League Players Get Paid Without a Union?,
HARDBALL TIMES (May 16, 2019), https://tht.fangraphs.com/can-minor-league-
players-get-paid-without-a-union/ [https://perma.cc/A7FY-SU4Q] (arguing “play-
ers and advocates can engage in both advocacy for current opportunities, and if
they are able to gain momentum, could even propose proactive changes to im-
prove their compensation”).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; BA in Journalism, The Pennsylvania State University, 2015. To Max—Words
cannot express my appreciation for your unconditional support and endless en-
couragement in pursuing my dreams. To my family and friends—thank you for the
relentless support and enthusiasm you have always shown me. To Steph, Fran-
cesco, Hannah, Kirsten, Horv, and the rest of MSLJ—thank you for all of the hard
work you put into the Journal, and especially for your efforts in sharpening this
article.
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